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TOWARDS AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Iman Anabtawi* & Steven L. Schwarczt
The global financial crisis demonstrated the inability and unwillingness
of financial market participants to safeguard the stability of the financial sys-
tem. It also highlighted the enormous direct and indirect costs of addressing
systemic crises after they have occurred, as opposed to attempting to prevent
them from arising. Governments and international organizations are respond-
ing with measures intended to make the financial system more resilient to eco-
nomic shocks, many of which will be implemented by regulatory bodies over
time. These measures suffer, however, from the lack of a theoretical account of
how systemic risk propagates within the financial system and why regulatory
intervention is needed to disrupt it. In this Article, we address this deficiency by
examining how systemic risk is transmitted. We then proceed to explain why,
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in the absence of regulation, market participants cannot be relied upon to dis-
rupt or otherwise limit the transmission of systemic risk. Finally, we advance
an analytical framework to inform systemic risk regulation.
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INTRODUCTION
Governments worldwide are struggling with the challenge of reg-
ulating financial systemic risk-the risk that a localized adverse shock,
such as the collapse of a firm or market, will have repercussions that
negatively impact the broader economy.' In the United States, legisla-
tors have enacted an array of measures intended to strengthen the
financial system, many of which consist of broad delegations of
authority to regulators who will need to implement them in the years
ahead. These measures, however, are largely a response to the recent
global financial crisis. None is situated within a general theoretical
framework for understanding how systemic risk is transmitted or how
regulation should address it. As a result, financial regulatory reform
may succeed in addressing the specific problems that led to the recent
financial crisis. Because economic shocks are generally unpredict-
able, 2 however, the measures enacted are unlikely to be effective
against future financial crises.
This Article analyzes the potential for regulation to make the
financial system more resilient to the risk of collapse. We begin, in
Part I, by examining how systemic risk is transmitted. We posit that
two otherwise independent correlations can combine to transmit
localized economic shocks into broader systemic crises.3 The first is an
intra-firm correlation between a firm's financial integrity and its expo-
sure to the risk of low-probability adverse events that either constitute
or could lead to economic shocks.4 The second is an inter-institu-
tional correlation among financial firms and markets (collectively,
"institutions"). 5 As we illustrate using four financial crises within the
past century, these two correlations have at times combined histori-
1 Cf Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 CEO. L.J. 193, 204 (2008) (defining
systemic risk in terms of the consequences of economic shocks).
2 See id. at 216.
3 Correlations are at the heart of systemic risk. Uncorrelated or negatively corre-
lated risk can be protected against through diversification. See RicHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 446 (6th ed. 2003) (observing that for risk that is uncorre-
lated or negatively correlated with market risk, the randomly distributed movements
of a diversified investment portfolio "would tend to cancel out, producing a riskless
portfolio").
4 In the interest of brevity, we refer in the remainder of this Article to this corre-
lation as the correlation between low-probability risk and firm integrity.
5 Our use of the term "institution" in the remainder of this Article encompasses
both firms and markets.
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cally to potentiate the transmission of localized economic shocks
throughout the financial system.6
After describing a transmission mechanism for systemic risk and
demonstrating its operation, we examine, in Part II, whether market
participants can be relied on to protect against systemic risk without
regulatory intervention. We identify a series of market failures, in part
caused by behavioral failures that make it unlikely that they will do so.
These failures-which consist of conflicts of interest, complacency,
complexity, and a type of tragedy of the commons-collectively
obscure or motivate firms to ignore the impact of their risk-taking on
systemic stability.
Because of these failures, regulation has an important role to play
in managing systemic risk. To be effective, however, regulatory mea-
sures directed at enhancing the stability of the financial system must
be designed in the context of an analytical framework that both cap-
tures the systemic transmission of economic shocks and explains the
behavioral and other market failures that justify intervention. In Part
III, we show that government can disrupt the transmission of systemic
risk by addressing these failures. We then apply our analysis to the
four financial crises discussed in Part I.
A primary lesson of the recent global financial crisis is that
attempts to address systemic crises after they have occurred are enor-
mously costly. They can also encourage moral hazard by financial
firms that anticipate being rescued from public funds. Regulation can
play an important role in limiting these costs. Effective systemic risk
regulation should attempt to weaken correlations within the financial
system that serve to transmit systemic risk. The task is urgent because
increasing complexity within the financial system will make these cor-
relations increasingly likely to arise, as well as to combine, in the
future.
I. THE ROLE OF INTRA- AND INTER-INSTITUTIONAL CORRELATIONS IN
THE TRANSMISSION OF LOCALIZED ECONOMIC SHOCKS TO
THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM
Four financial crises within the past century-the Great Depres-
sion, the meltdown of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), the
collapse of Enron, and the recent global financial crisis-illustrate
that two seemingly independent correlations can combine to poten-
tiate the transmission of localized economic shocks throughout the
6 In two of these crises the correlations led to systemic effects. In the other two,
one of the correlations was either absent or was blocked by policymakers, and only
localized harm occurred. See infra Part I.
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financial system, amplifying them in the process. The first of these is a
correlation between low-probability risk and firm financial integrity,
and the second is a correlation among financial institutions. In Part I,
we describe these two correlations and examine how they can com-
bine. We then use the correlations to explain systemic risk transmis-
sion in the specific contexts of the foregoing crises.
We recognize that additional financial crises have occurred over
the past century and longer, and that a complete study of all such
crises might indicate additional correlations within the financial sys-
tem. Nonetheless, the ability of the combination of these two correla-
tions to potentiate the transmission of economic shocks makes them
worthy of study even if other correlations exist. 7
A. The Correlations as Systemic Risk Transmission Mechanisms
Our starting point is the definition of systemic risk proposed by
one of us in his Georgetown LawJournal article, Systemic Risk.8 In that
article, the author recognized that the term "systemic risk" has been
used in various ways, sometimes inconsistently. 9 Drawing on the
importance of the dynamic relationships among institutions in the
financial system, he advanced the following working definition of sys-
temic risk:
[T]he risk that (i) an economic shock such as market or institu-
tional failure triggers (through a panic or otherwise) either (X) the
failure of a chain of markets or institutions or (Y) a chain of signifi-
cant losses to financial institutions, (ii) resulting in increases in the
cost of capital or decreases in its availability, often evidenced by sub-
stantial financial-market price volatility. 10
7 It also should be noted that our identification of the correlations we describe
arose in studying the four financial crises discussed in Part I. We did not select those
crises to exemplify the correlations.
8 See Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 198.
9 See id. at 196-97.
10 Id. at 204. For our purposes, there are two features of this definition worth
emphasizing. First, it does not distinguish among types of financial market partici-
pants. In other words, focus is not on the character of individual firms, but rather on
their potential to affect capital markets. Any financial market participant to which
other financial institutions are exposed, either directly or indirectly, theoretically
poses systemic risk. Second, the definition contemplates a localized economic shock
that sets in motion other failures or losses within the financial system. It is thus dis-
tinct from the concept of systematic risk, which affects all market participants concur-
rently. See Anton Korinek, Systemic Risk-Taking: Amplification Effects, Externalities,
and Regulatory Responses 3 (Mar. 28, 2010) (unpublished research paper), available
at http://www.korinek.com/download/SystemicRisk.pdf (describing "systematic" risk
as risk that cannot be diversified away).
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While the foregoing definition is helpful in establishing the
nature and scope of the problem we are addressing, it does not iden-
tify the mechanisms by which an economic shock produces systemic
consequences. By setting forth a description of the mechanisms by
which shocks can travel from their points of origin to the rest of the
financial system, we hope to shed light on the most promising avenues
for regulatory policies directed at managing systemic risk.
The first correlation that we identify describes the relationship
between low-probability risk and firm integrity. By "low-probability,"
we do not mean an occurrence that is unforeseeable. Such events,
referred to as "black swans" by Nassim Taleb, cannot be identified ex
ante." Rather, we are addressing what Taleb calls "gray swans"-
events that are rare but nevertheless predictable. 12 The latter events,
unlike the former, are susceptible to measurement and prediction.' 3
Managing the risk to which a business is exposed is the domain of
corporate risk managers.' 4 Corporate risk managers address risk by
engaging in prudent risk-taking and using financial hedging instru-
ments as risk-management tools. In these ways, managers are able to
pursue strategies for increasing firm value that would otherwise
exceed the firm's tolerance for risk. In managing risk, however, we
believe that managers of financial firms systematically underestimate
the likelihood of encountering low-probability adverse events. In Part
II.A.1, we theorize that this tendency results from managerial conflicts
of interest, undue complacency when forecasting low-probability
adverse events, and increased financial complexity which makes risk
harder to assess. Together, these factors cause financial firms to
charge too little for bearing low-probability risks. Financial integrity is
thereby eroded at the individual firm level.
Focusing on individual financial firms does not capture the full
impact on the financial system of underestimating low-probability
11 NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN 18 (2007).
12 Id. at 37. There are several species of swan, including the Mute Swan (the
common white swan) and the Black Swan. The rarest of the swan species is the Trum-
peter Swan. Other than the Black Swan and the Black-necked Swan, all swans are
entirely white (except during their first year when most are gray). E-mail from Dr.
Mel Levine, Vice Chairman of the Bd. of the Sylvan Heights Waterfowl Park and Eco-
Center, to Steven L. Schwarcz (Feb. 11, 2010, 07:59 EST) (on file with authors).
13 See FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTV, AND PROFIT 197-232 (Cosimo 2006)
(1921) (distinguishing between risk and uncertainty).
14 Risk management is concerned with "identifying and managing a firm's expo-
sure to financial risk where financial risk is defined as the variability in cash flows and
market values caused by unpredictable [macroeconomic] changes." Fred R. Kaen,
Risk Management, Corporate Governance and the Public Corporation, in RISK MANAGEMENT
423, 423 (Michael Frenkel et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005).
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adverse events, however. There is a broader impact of a firm's risk-
bearing decisions arising out of the financial system's interconnectiv-
ity. The financial system is comprised of institutions that are highly
interrelated. In this sense, it is a "network.'1 5 The transmission of risk
through a network can serve to absorb shocks, dispersing risk among
members. 16 But it can also amplify shocks, potentially leading to sys-
temic collapse. 17 Our second correlation-the correlation among
financial institutions-attempts to capture this effect.
As we explain in greater detail in Part II.A.2, financial firms gen-
erally underappreciate interconnectivity when making business deci-
sions. This implicates risk-taking in two ways. First, firms fail to fully
internalize the direct costs that their risky activities impose on other
financial firms with whom they have relationships. Reduced
creditworthiness at one financial firm, for example, compromises the
financial condition of the counterparties with which it is intertwined
through a wide range of possible dealings. Yet, firms tend to take
insufficient account of the potential impact of their own financial con-
dition on other firms. ' Firms also fail to fully internalize the indirect
costs that their risky activities impose on financial markets. For exam-
ple, asset values can decline when a firm must sell substantial assets
rapidly due to liquidity needs. When such "fire" sales depress the
prices of the assets being sold, the financial condition of other firms
that hold the same or similar assets deteriorates. 19 Some of these
other firms will consequently face liquidity needs of their own and be
forced to sell assets, further depressing asset prices, which produces a
positive feedback loop. Market dynamics can thus serve to transmit
and amplify an individual firm's distress. In under-appreciating their
interconnections to other institutions, financial market participants
take on socially excessive risk levels that increase the fragility of the
financial system.
In combination, the foregoing correlations can be sufficient to
transmit a localized adverse economic shock throughout the financial
15 Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-2008,
23J. ECON. PERSP. 77, 96 (2009) (describing the modern financial system as an "inter-
woven network of financial obligations"); see infra note 86 and accompanying text.
16 See Rob Nijskens & Wolf Wagner, Credit Risk Transfer Activities and Systemic
Risk: How Banks Became Less Risky Individually but Posed Greater Risks to the Finan-
cial System at the Same Time 2 (Dec. 23, 2008) (unpublished working paper), availa-
ble at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1319689 (pointing out
that the main rationale behind credit risk transfer activities by financial institutions is
to diversify away concentrated risk exposures).
17 See id.
18 See infra notes 104-09 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
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system, amplifying it in the process. Importantly, neither correlation,
acting by itself, will potentiate a systemic crisis. For example, an intra-
institutional correlation involving the failure of a financial firm will
not, without more, impair the entire financial system. Similarly, the
interconnectivity among financial institutions is not, by itself, a threat
to the financial system without a firm or market failure that acts as a
catalyst. Operating together, however, these correlations create a
transmission mechanism that can allow even what might appear to be
a modest localized adverse economic shock to generate severe sys-
temic consequences.
B. Using the Correlations to Explain Financial Crises
In Part I.A, we presented an account of how economic shocks can
be converted into systemic crises through the combined operation of
the correlation between low-probability risk and firm integrity and the
correlation among institutions. When both correlations are operative
within a financial system, unforeseen economic shocks that begin as
isolated phenomena can become systemically dangerous. In Part I.B,
we show how the correlations can be applied to help explain the
dynamics of four specific financial crises within the past century.
1. The Great Depression
Although the causes of the Great Depression are still being
debated, the two correlations described above, working in combina-
tion, appear to have been causal factors. Prior to the Depression,
many banks engaged in margin lending to risky borrowers, securing
the loans by shares of stock that the borrowers purchased with the
loan proceeds. The value of the stock collateral started out being at
least equal to the amount of the loan, and banks assumed that the
stock market, which had been continuously rising in value for some
years,20 would continue to rise, or at least not decline, in value. 21
At the time, that assumption was viewed as reasonable. 22 In
August 1929, however, there was a (relatively) modest decline in stock
20 See Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr., Did Universal Banks Play a Significant Role in the U.S.
Economy's Boom-and-Bust Cycle of 1921-33? A Preliminary Assessment, in 4 CURRENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN MONETARY AND FINANcIAL LAW 559 (2005), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=838267.
21 See WILLIAM K. KLINGAMAN, 1929: THE YEAR OF THE GREAT CRASH 54, 58 (1989).
22 See id. at 57-58. This assumption was viewed as reasonable notwithstanding the
fact that stock prices basically went sideways from 1900 until the early 1920s, with
steep drops occurring in 1902-03, 1906-07, and 1916-17. SeeJohn Armour & Brian
Cheffins, Offensive Shareholder Activism in U.S. Public Companies, 1900-1949, at 22
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prices, 23 causing some of these margin loans to become under-collat-
eralized. 24 Some banks that were heavily engaged in margin lending
lost so much money on the loans that they became unable to pay their
debts. This illustrates the intra-institutional correlation between low-
probability risk-in this case, the risk that collateral value may become
insufficient-and firm integrity. Bankers failed to appreciate this
correlation.
The Depression also illustrates how the foregoing correlation,
operating in combination with an inter-institutional correlation (in
this case, an interconnectedness among banks), can potentiate the
transmission of an economic shock into a broader systemic shock. As
described above, some banks lost so much money in margin lending
that they themselves became unable to pay their debts. These debts
consisted not only of amounts due depositors but, more systemically
significant, debts due to other banks. As a result, defaults by margin-
lending banks on their obligations to other banks often adversely
affected the other banks' ability to meet their obligations to yet other
banks, and "so on down the chain of banks and beyond. '2 5 Bankers
failed to see or appreciate this second correlation, and they almost
certainly failed to foresee that the two correlations would combine.
2. Long-Term Capital Management
The meltdown of LTCM, a large hedge fund that engaged in arbi-
trage-related trading strategies, was also caused, at least in part, by the
two correlations we have described working in combination. LTCM's
failure to foresee temporary market irrationality in bond pricing dur-
ing August 1998, touched off by the Russian government's default on
its bonds, caused LTCM to lose hundreds of millions of dollars and
undermined its financial viability.2 6 This represented a failure by
(Univ. of Cambridge Faculty of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No.
09/2011, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=
1759983. Bankers therefore convinced themselves that stock prices could not go
down on the basis of the 1920s bull market, ignoring earlier stock market
performance.
23 See KLINGAMAN, supra note 21, at 217.
24 Id.
25 George G. Kaufman, Bank Failures, Systemic Risk, and Bank Regulation, 16 CATO
J. 17, 21 (1996). These effects were exacerbated when, after the stock market crash of
October 1929, depositors attempted en masse to convert their bank deposits into
cash, creating additional demands on troubled banks to pay debts. See Schwarcz,
supra note 1, at 199-200.
26 See ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-
TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 144-46, 164, 169-70 (2000).
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LTCM to fully appreciate a correlation between low-probability risk
and firm integrity. 27
LTCM's losses also implicated the second correlation. Most mar-
ket observers at the time failed to appreciate the tight correlation
between hedge funds, which were unregulated, and banks. Hedge
funds and banks were closely linked, however, through derivatives-
based hedging. At the last minute, the U.S. Federal Reserve Board
realized that LTCM's default might trigger a wave of defaults in world-
wide financial markets.28 To avoid this, the Fed proactively stepped in
to broker a settlement of LTCM's debts. 29
3. Enron
To preserve its primary and most profitable business strategy,30
Enron needed to preserve its investment-grade rating. 31 The main
risk to this rating was the possibility that Enron's so-called "merchant
assets" might drop in value, requiring Enron to mark (down) to mar-
ket those asset values. 32 Enron sought to avoid marking down those
asset values by engaging in a series of structured transactions that
effectively used Enron stock, which had an historically rising public-
market price, as collateral to hedge the value of those assets. In a
typical transaction, Enron would transfer Enron stock to a special-pur-
pose entity (SPE) in exchange for notes or cash, and would also
directly or indirectly guarantee the SPE's value. 3 3 The SPE, in turn,
would hedge the value of certain merchant assets on Enron's balance
sheet.3 4 Because of its historically rising stock price, Enronjudged the
risk that it would have to pay on its guarantee as remote. 35
27 Cf Paul Krugman, Rashomon in Connecticut: What Really Happened to Long-Term
Capital Management?, SLATE (Oct. 2, 1998, 3:30 AM), http://www.slate.com/id/1908
(discussing LTCM's failure to account for the low-probability risk of temporary mar-
ket-pricing irrationality).
28 See Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 201.
29 Hedge Fund Operations: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Banking and Fin. Serms.,
105th Cong. 18-19 (1998) (statement of William J. McDonough, President, Federal
Reserve Bank of New York) (describing ways that the problems of LTCM could have
caused more widespread financial troubles).
30 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Enron and the Use and Abuse of Special Purpose Entities in
Corporate Structures, 70 U. CIN. L. REv. 1309, 1309-10 (2002) (describing that strategy
as acting as a derivatives counterparty).
31 See id.
32 See id. at 1309 n.2.
33 See id. at 1310.
34 See id.
35 See id. at 1310, 1315.
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When Enron's stock price subsequently fell to unanticipated
levels, the value of these SPEs also fell, triggering the Enron guaran-
tees; the guarantee payments in turn apparently further reduced
Enron stock value, triggering additional guarantee payments.36 Coin-
cidentally, the value of Enron's merchant assets concurrently fell. 37
Because the guarantee payments sapped the SPEs' financial strength,
they could no longer effectively hedge the value of Enron's merchant
assets, causing Enron to lose its investment-grade rating.38 Deprived
of its primary business strategy, Enron had little choice but to file for
bankruptcy. 39
Enron's collapse thus represents a failure to appreciate the corre-
lation between low-probability risk and firm integrity because Enron
failed to appreciate the risk that a fall in the value of its merchant
assets could be coupled with a significant fall in the price of Enron
stock used as collateral, and that the firm would collapse as a result.
But Enron's collapse did not trigger a systemic financial crisis, appar-
ently because its collapse did not closely correlate with the viability of
other financial institutions.40
4. The Recent Global Financial Crisis
The recent global financial crisis almost certainly was caused, or
at least exacerbated, by the two correlations working in combination.
In recent years, many mortgage lenders made loans to risky borrowers
secured by the homes that the borrowers purchased with the loan pro-
ceeds. These "subprime mortgage loans" were then bundled together
as collateral to partially support the payment of complex asset-backed
securities that were sold to banks and other institutional investors
worldwide. 4' These securities maintained their value so long as home
36 See id. at 1310.
37 See id.
38 See id. at 1310-11.
39 See id.
40 But cf Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Remarks to the Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago's 2003 Conference on Bank Structure and Competition
(May 8, 2003), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/
2003/20030508/default.htm (arguing that that the widespread use of credit-default
swaps mitigated the potentially devastating repercussions of the "largest corporate
defaults in history (WorldCom and Enron)").
41 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Keynote Address: Understanding the Subprime Financial Cri-
sis, 60 S.C. L. REv. 549, 550-52 (2009). Although lenders made these subprime loans
to risky borrowers, the basic business model was not irrational and had some success-
ful precedent. See id. at 550.
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prices appreciated, as they had been doing for decades and as most
market observers assumed would continue. 42
When home prices began falling, some of these asset-backed
securities began defaulting,43 requiring financial institutions heavily
invested in these securities to write down their value, causing these
institutions to appear, if not be, financially risky.44 This represented a
failure to see, or at least to fully appreciate, the correlation between
low-probability risk-the risk that home prices would significantly
fal145-and firm integrity.
The recent financial crisis also involved a failure to see a correla-
tion among financial institutions-in this case, a failure to see both
the tight interconnectedness among not just banks but also non-bank
financial institutions (such as Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and
AIG) ,46 as well as the tight interconnectedness among financial
institutions.
What made the financial crisis so devastating was that these fail-
ures combined to facilitate the transmission of economic shocks. As
financial firms perceived the riskiness of other financial firms
("counterparty risk") 47 increasing, they stopped dealing with each
other, thereby reducing the availability of credit.48 Similarly, as securi-
ties backed by subprime loans began defaulting, investors stopped
investing not only in those securities but also in securities backed by
other types of collateral and in debt securities more generally. 49
42 SeeJack Guttentag, Shortsighted About the Subprime Disaster, WASH. POST, May 26,
2007, at F2 (explaining that because housing prices had been rising for a long period
of time, it was assumed that they would continue to rise).
43 See Schwarcz, supra note 41, at 550-51 (explaining that home appreciation had
been expected to enable risky borrowers to refinance to lower interest rates).
44 See id. at 553.
45 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime
Mortgage Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REv. 373, 379-80 n.35 (2008) (citing, among others,
Taleb, supra note 11, for the human tendency to fail to anticipate improbable events).
46 Cf Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 203 (observing that size of financial institution
rather than "bank" status has become more systemically important).
47 See infra note 87.
48 Market participants are bound to become concerned about counterparty risk
in the aftermath of an economic shock, such as the collapse of Lehman Brothers,
because all parties are only aware of their own contractual obligations. Concern over
perceived counterparty risk becomes self-fulfilling because firms become reluctant to
deal with each other. This creates additional funding needs; for example, it increases
the price of credit default swaps. See Brunnermeier, supra note 15, at 97-98.
49 See Schwarcz, supra note 45, at 395. The original defaults on securities backed
by subprime loans implicated only highly leveraged ABS CDO securities, but those
defaults triggered a lack of confidence in the broader asset-backed securities markets
and in rating-agency ratings, which in turn triggered a lack of investor confidence in
136o [VOL. 86:4
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Because debt markets had been supplanting banks as sources of
credit, reduced investment in those markets further reduced the avail-
ability of credit.50 The resulting lack of credit contributed to the col-
lapse of the real economy. 5'
II. CONSTRAINTS ON THE ABILITY AND WILLINGNESS OF MARKET
PARTICIPANTS TO ADDRESS SYSTEMIC RISK TRANSMISSION
We do not believe that financial market participants will, on their
own, expend sufficient effort in identifying and attempting to prevent
the correlations we described in Part I from combining so as to
achieve a desirably low level of financial systemic risk. Financial regu-
latory measures are needed to publicly manage that risk. Consistent
with this view, regulators have begun to address perceived sources of
excessive risk-taking and instability within the financial system. 52
Recent regulatory efforts may go some way toward reducing systemic
risk. It is our view, however, that additional measures are, and will
continue to be, needed to protect the financial system from unfore-
seen economic shocks. In part, this is because the measures that have
been adopted respond to practices specific to the recent global finan-
cial crisis, rather than addressing its fundamental causes. It is also
because financial innovation can rapidly make existing regulation
weak or ineffective.
In Part II we suggest that a series of behavioral and other market
failures leads to systemic instability. Our approach focuses on identi-
fying the constraints on the ability and willingness of market partici-
pants to address intra-institutional and inter-institutional correlations
in the financial system or to prevent them from combining. We begin
by describing these constraints. We then consider the likelihood that
such impediments will continue to exist in the future.
the broader markets for debt securities. See Schwarcz, supra note 41, at 552; see also
Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REv. 211,
223 (2009) (observing that although these (ABS CDO) securities were backed by what
appeared to be significantly diverse assets, there was an underlying correlation in the
subprime mortgage loans backing many of those securities).
50 This ongoing shift of the source of corporate financing from banks to financial
and capital markets is referred to as disintermediation. See Schwarcz, supra note 1, at
200. Around the time of the recent financial crisis, "conventional commercial bank
lending had dropped to [only] 30 percent" of corporate financing. Mortimer B.
Zuckerman, No Time to Lose, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 2009, at 80.
51 See Schwarcz, supra note 41, at 571.
52 See infra notes 227-236 and accompanying text.
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A. Impediments to Financial Market Self-Regulation
In prior scholarship, one of us has argued that the global finan-
cial crisis can be attributed in large part to conflicts, complacency, and
complexity, as well as to a type of tragedy of the commons, within the
financial system. 53 In Part II.A, we extend that scholarship to develop
a general theoretical framework that can help to explain why market
participants tend to make risk-taking choices without adequate regard
for the impact of those choices on the financial system.
1. Explaining Risk Transmission Through the Intra-Firm
Correlation Between Low-Probability Risk and Firm
Integrity
In the world of corporate finance, risk refers to the probability
that the return on an investment will deviate from its expected, or
long-term average, return.54 Financial risk is defined in terms of the
distribution of "actual" around "expected" returns. 55 The actual
return on a risk-free investment will always equal its expected return
because its return is treated as being certain. When a firm makes a
risky investment, however, it is possible that its actual return will be a
surprise. That surprise may be positive or negative. Thus, risk
presents firms with a tradeoff: In exchange for receiving the possibility
of a greater-than-expected return on an investment, a firm must
expose itself to the possibility of a return that is lower than expected.56
53 See Schwarcz, supra note 45, at 404. Running throughout these causes is
another cause-cupidity; but because greed is so ingrained in human nature and so
intertwined with the other causes, it adds little insight to view it separately.
54 More formally, the expected return on an investment is calculated by multiply-
ing the investment's potential gains or losses by their respective probabilities. See STE_
PHEN LUMBY & CHRIS JONES, CORPORATE FINANCE 209 (Thomson 7th ed. 2003).
55 SeeAsWATH DAMODARAN, CORPORATE FINANCE 151 (2d ed. 2001).
56 An investor can, for example, purchase a one-year treasury bill, which is typi-
cally assumed to carry no default risk, with a 0.3% annual expected return represent-
ing only the time value of money. At the end of five years, the actual return on the
investment will have been 0.3%. This is a risk-free investment. In contrast, consider
an investor willing to bear risk who buys 100 shares of Google. That investor may
anticipate making thirty percent on his money at the end of the year. The actual
return over this period, however, may be higher or lower than thirty percent. In
statistical terms, the spread of the actual returns around the expected return is mea-
sured by the variance of the distribution. The greater the variance, the greater the
deviation of actual returns from expected returns. When distributions of returns are
normal, that is, symmetric, the variance of a distribution measures risk. It follows that
risk-averse investors faced with a choice between two investments with the same
expected returns but different variances will always prefer the one with the smaller
variance. As a result, investments with higher variances must compensate investors
1362 [VOL. 86:4
REGULATING SYSTEMIC RISK
From a risk-management perspective, risks facing financial insti-
tutions fall into three general categories: (i) risks that can be elimi-
nated through diversification; (ii) risks that can be transferred to
other financial market participants; and (iii) risks that should not, or
cannot, be transferred and must be retained. 57 The first category of
risks relates to idiosyncratic events to which a firm is exposed. This
category includes, for example, the risk associated with a specific pro-
ject undertaken by a single business unit within a firm. Whether the
project succeeds or fails will have an impact on the business unit that
undertook the project, but the firm can usually limit that impact to
the unit by diversifying the array of projects that the firm's other units
select. Other risks may be non-diversifiable but transferable to other
market participants. Markets exist for many types of risks assumed by
financial institutions. For example, firms can transfer credit risk
through products such as swaps or other derivatives. Borrowing terms
can be altered to effect a change in asset duration. In addition, insur-
ance contracts provide firms with a means of shifting risk. Finally,
firms retain and absorb risks that they cannot efficiently eliminate or
have a comparative advantage holding.
Because risk is costly to manage or bear, risk-takers must be paid
an expected return to compensate them for assuming the burden of
uncertainty.58 In a perfectly competitive market the expected return
on an investment accurately reflects its associated risk. As we describe
below, however, we believe that low-probability risks are systematically
underpriced, resulting in firms assuming excessive risk relative to the
amount of risk they should take in order to maximize firm value.
Within our framework, excessive risk-taking by financial firms is corre-
lated with weaker firm integrity because the downside to a firm of
taking on excessive risk is a deterioration of its financial condition, or
possibly its collapse.
a. Conflicts
Within firms, conflicts of interest exist between day-to-day manag-
ers (senior and lower-level executives), on the one hand, and non-
manager stakeholders (shareholders, debtholders, employees, as well
with higher expected returns. See id. at 151-53; see also infra note 58 (discussing the
risk versus return relationship).
57 See Anthony M. Santomero, Risk Management in Banking: Practice Reviewed and
Questioned, in RISK MANAGEMENT AND REGULATION IN BANKING 15, 17 (Dan Galai et al.
eds., 1999).
58 The positive relationship between risk and return is a direct consequence of
the risk aversion of most investors. See Richard A. Posner, Law and the Theory of
Finance: Some Intersections, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 159, 161 (1986).
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as other corporate constituents) 59 on the other hand. This is most
pronounced at large publicly held firms. In such firms, ownership is
widely dispersed, with managers typically owning only a small percent-
age of their companies' equity. Thus, managers' private interests do
not naturally coincide with the interests of other stakeholders.
The foregoing conflict of interest is commonly referred to as an
"agency problem" between those who own the firm (the principals)
and those who operate it (the agents). 60 Conflicts of interest are
important for our purposes because they have implications for the
price that firms charge in exchange for agreeing to bear risk. If man-
agers are insulated from the full consequences of their firms' expo-
sure to risk, their decisions may not accurately reflect the cost to their
firms of engaging in risky activities.
In fact, both senior and secondary managers at financial firms are
typically incentivized in ways that lead them to undervalue risk-taking
from the perspective of the firms' other constituencies. This can
result in a failure to identify or fully appreciate the first correlation-
between low-probability risk and firm integrity. Financial institutions
routinely compensate senior executives by making their pay contin-
gent on the value of the firm's common stock or that of a parent hold-
ing company. 61 In practice, however, these compensation schemes
provide managers with incentives to run their firms differently from
the way shareholders would like. This is most obvious in the case of
option-based compensation, whereby the option holder enjoys the
right to purchase an interest in the company's common stock at a
stated price over a specified period of time based on stated eligibility
requirements. Such arrangements encourage executives to focus on
short-term results-namely, results spanning the duration of their
options.62 Executives are allowed to cash in their options while the
risks embedded in their decisions remain with the firm. They are also
allowed to reap rewards on the upside without having to suffer losses
other than the expiration of the option on the downside. 63 Typical
59 For a general discussion of both the allocation of corporate decisionmaking
power within the firm and the social role of the corporation, see STEPHEN M. BAN-
BRIDGE, Co~oRArE LAw §§ 5, 9 (2d ed. 2008).
60 See id. § 75.
61 See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear
Stearns and Lehman 2000-2008, 27 YALEJ. ON REG. 257, 263-64 (2010) (discussing the
compensation of bank executives).
62 See id. at 265.
63 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the
Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 751, 777 (2002). But see David I.
Walker, The Challenge of Improving the Long-Term Focus of Executive Pay, 51 B.C. L. REV.
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bonus plans, which are contingent on a firm's earnings, share this fea-
ture.64 Even the use of restricted stock, which has been the compensa-
tion technique advocated most enthusiastically by those seeking to
tighten the link between executive pay and firm performance, 6- does
not fully align managerial and shareholder incentives because the
time horizons of restricted stock and unrestricted stock differ.66
Conflicts of interest are also created by the compensation struc-
tures of secondary managers operating at subordinate levels of the
hierarchy of financial institutions. 67 Secondary managers are typically
compensated based on their execution of assigned tasks, without
regard to the long-term effects of their actions. 68 While these employ-
ees are not top executives charged with setting firm policies, they nev-
ertheless exercise significant discretion over matters that can affect
the financial integrity of their employers. Secondary managers likely
to have such influence include analysts and other individuals who
structure, sell, or invest in securities on behalf of the firm. The influ-
ence of secondary managers is heightened by the nature of their tasks.
These tasks are often technically challenging, such as analyzing com-
plex structured securities, and the most senior managers are likely to
have less, or at least less recent, technical training and experience in
performing them. Thus, the ability of the most senior managers to
monitor secondary managers is relatively weak.
If managers-whether senior or secondary-are insulated from
the full effect of the downside risk of their decisions they will, on aver-
age, benefit more from their firms' large gains than they will lose from
their firms' large losses. This asymmetric payoff structure will incen-
tivize managers to under-weight potential adverse consequences to
435, 451 n.79 (2010) (noting that the incentives of executives include elements such
as the prospect of advancement or the threat of dismissal).
64 See Ant6nio Cfmara, Earnings-Based Bonus Compensation, 44 FIN. REv. 469, 470
(2009) (noting the similarity between an option and a typical bonus).
65 See Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, The Trouble with Stock Options 20 (Harvard
Bus. Sch., Negotiation, Orgs. & Mkts. Unit, Research Paper No. 03-33, 2003), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=415040 (arguing that the
granting of restricted stock rather than options better aligns managerial and share-
holder incentives because managers holding restricted stock have less incentive to
undertake risky investments).
66 The granting of restricted stock aligns managerial and shareholder incentives
only to the extent that managers are precluded from unloading these shares for a
significant time period. See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORM-
ANCE 171-73 (2004).
67 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The Problem of Secondary-
Management Agency Costs, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 457, 458 (2009).
68 See id. at 460.
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the firm of the decisions they make. Managers will tend to favor high
risk strategies that have high variances and low or negative expected
returns. They may assume risks for which their firms are not ade-
quately compensated. Indeed, they may do so even if they see and
appreciate the risks inherent in their actions. Simply put, managers
will have an incentive to gamble with their firms' assets. 69
b. Complacency
Behavioral bias is another distorting influence within financial
firms that compromises the ability of managers to assess low-
probability risks. Having behavioral biases, individuals make system-
atic errors in judgment. Here, we consider biases that induce deci-
sionmakers to place undue confidence in, or attribute erroneous
distributional properties to, unrepresentative samples. 70 Collectively,
these biases suggest that during periods of economic stability manag-
ers tend to focus on the opportunity that risk-taking offers for generat-
ing out-sized rewards and become dull to the danger it poses to the
integrity of their firms.
Complete probability distributions for the occurrences of an eco-
nomic shock are unobservable. To estimate the likelihood of various
outcomes we must rely on available data and then make assumptions
about the universe from which those data were drawn. In a limited
sample there is a considerable danger that the data we observe will not
represent its true underlying distribution. 71 Behavioral biases provide
a useful guide for determining how individuals are likely to assess risk
when making decisions with limited data. One relevant tendency,
"optimism bias," is the observed pattern that people are unrealistically
optimistic about the outcomes of uncertain events. This includes
69 The optimal contracting model underlying most scholarship in the area of
executive compensation suggests that managers, who typically own only a small per-
centage of their companies' stock, will fail to maximize shareholder wealth by expos-
ing their firms to too little risk. See Iman Anabtawi, Explaining Pay Without Performance:
The Tournament Alternative, 54 EMORY L.J. 1557, 1561 (2005). Here, we suggest that
compensation schemes designed to encourage risk-taking by managers can create the
opposite effect. Managers who face asymmetric payoffs in which they do not have to
bear the full costs of their risk-taking decisions may engage in excessive risk-taking. See
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers' Pay, 98 GEo. L.J. 247,
262-63 (2010) (describing the impact of option-based compensation on risk
appetite).
70 See Matthew Rabin, Inference by Believers in the Law of Small Numbers, 117 Q.J.
ECON. 775, 776, 785-87 (2002).
71 Cf TALEB, supra note 11, at 40 (illustrating the difficulty of predicting the
future from past data by using the example of a turkey who believes, until the day
before Thanksgiving, that its feeder is solely a benefactor).
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over-estimating positive outcomes and under-estimating negative
ones. Another demonstrated bias of individuals is to discount the
probability of an event's occurrence based on the length of time since
it last occurred or how extreme it was. This is known as "availability
bias" and reflects the tendency of a recent or especially vivid event to
be the most readily accessible example in a person's mind.72 Opti-
mism bias and availability bias play a role in explaining why individu-
als systematically underestimate the likelihood of very rare but
potentially devastating risks-a phenomenon known as "disaster myo-
pia." People are unrealistically optimistic when thinking about
extreme events with which they have no recent experience, and they
may undervalue the importance of those events.
In the presence of the foregoing biases, assessments of the risk of
low-probability adverse events are generally understated. The prob-
lem will be especially acute during periods in which there have been
no major adverse economic shocks; recent stability will allay fears of
adverse occurrences. Market participants may begin to view the data
as following a normal distribution, in which observations that deviate
dramatically from the mean lie in the distribution's thin tails. In real-
ity, however, the data may come from a distribution of outcomes with
higher kurtosis, or "fat tails," so that the true risk of extreme events is
far greater than it is under a normal distribution. 73 Alternatively, deci-
sionmakers may underestimate low-probability events because of their
mundaneness. Unusual events, such as a large meteor hitting the
earth, are highly salient. In contrast, mundane events, such as
changes in collateral value, are commonplace, possibly existing on a
continuum. The familiarity with collateral of individuals working in
72 Under the availability heuristic, people overestimate the frequency or likeli-
hood of an event when examples of, or associations with, similar events are easily
brought to mind. For example, people typically overestimate the divorce rate if they
can quickly find examples of divorced friends. See Paul Slovic et al., Facts Versus Fears:
Understanding Perceived Risk, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY 463, 465 (Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
73 Similar errors are likely to arise when observed data come from an asymmetric
distribution. A negative-skewed, or left-skewed, distribution has relatively few values
on its left, its mean being lower than its median. Thus, in a negative-skewed distribu-
tion, a typical outcome will be above its expected value. Only occasionally will out-
comes from the lower tail be observed. Because of this, it will take a considerably
longer period of time to observe the true properties of a skewed distribution than a
normal one. As a result, decisionmakers are likely to underestimate the potential
losses their choices entail.
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the financial sector might have led them to underestimate the poten-
tial consequences of a drop in collateral prices.74
c. Complexity
Complexity can cause failures to identify or fully appreciate both
correlations. Complexity in the financial system refers to the elabo-
rate web of financial and legal relationships that increasingly under-
lies financial assets, investment securities, and financial markets. 75
Even a relatively simple financial asset, such as a mortgage loan,
involves complexity. Over time, loan originators have developed
more varied and sophisticated mortgage products, incorporating
terms such as adjustable rates, low or no down payment requirements,
interest-only payment options, and negative amortizations. 76 Valua-
tion of the loans depends on multiple factors, including the likeli-
hood that the obligor will default, movements in interest rates, and
whether the borrower will prepay the loan, thereby altering the mort-
gage's return on investment. 77
When financial assets, like mortgage loans, are pooled and used
to back investment securities, complexity grows. These so-called
"structured" or "asset-backed" securities can be constructed from
mortgage loans or virtually any other type of financial asset. Asset
securitization, for example, involves the creation and issuance by spe-
cial-purpose entities of investment securities of different classes, or
74 Cf HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM (Penguin Books 2006) (1963).
Arendt, who studied the trial of Eichmann in Jerusalem and the manner in which the
Holocaust was carried out, believed that devastating events like the Holocaust are
caused by relatively commonplace human behavior.
75 See Schwarcz, supra note 49, at 214.
76 See EDWARD VINCENT MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33775, ALTERNATIVE
MORTGAGES: RISKS TO CONSUMERS AND LENDERS IN THE CURRENT HOUSING CYCLE
(2006).
77 See THOMAS S.Y. Ho & SANG BIN LEE, THE OXFORD GUIDE TO FINANCIAL MODEL-
ING 348 (2004). Some assets, such as credit card loans, are further complicated
because, unlike mortgage loans, they have no fixed payment amount or amortization
schedule. Borrowers may pay in full, pay a minimum payment (usually two percent of
the outstanding balance), or even increase their balance up to a specified credit limit.
See Mark Furletti, An Overview of Credit Card Asset-Backed Securities 2 (Fed. Reserve Bank
of Phila., Payment Cards Ctr., Discussion Paper No. 02-14, 2002), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=927489; Suleman Baig, CDO ofABS: A
Primer on Performance Metrics and Test Measures, YIELDCURVE.COM, 4 (Dec. 2003), http://
www.yeldcurve.com/Mktresearch/files/Suleman CDOABSDecO3.pdf. To address
these challenges, credit card securities are typically issued separately through a revolv-
ing master trust, within which several credit accounts are pooled together to allow for
multiple bond issues as well as a revolving flow of receivables. See id.
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"tranches," based on a pool of financial assets. 78 The financial assets
underlying these securities serve as collateral for the obligations, and
each class of investment securities can have a different seniority of
payment priority with respect to the assets. 79 Securities in the most
senior classes are more highly rated as to their creditworthiness by
rating agencies because they enjoy a right to be allocated collections
on the underlying financial assets that is superior to the rights of the
more junior classes.80 Securitizations typically involve the creation
and interaction of multiple special purpose entities, an understanding
of numerous professional disciplines, and reliance on sometimes unt-
ested legal theories.8
The markets in which financial assets and the securities based on
them trade present further complexity for financial firms by creating
information uncertainty. Under the "indirect holding system,"
whereby virtually all debt and equity securities are traded,
intermediaries such as banks and brokers hold interests in securities
on behalf of investors. 82 Issuers of securities record ownership as
belonging to these intermediaries. As a result, third parties cannot
readily determine who ultimately owns, and thus has credit exposure
to, specific securities.
On the one hand, complexity-whether relating to financial
assets, the securities they underlie, or the markets in which they are
traded-can be used beneficially to enhance the functioning of finan-
cial markets. 8 3 On the other hand, it can pose serious challenges to
market participants seeking to understand and predict how the finan-
cial instruments in which they invest will behave under varying condi-
tions. Complexity increases the possibility that financial institutions
will fail to see, or at least fail to fully appreciate, low-probability shocks
that pose a threat to their financial condition.
Complexity implicates the first correlation insofar as it makes it
difficult for financial firms to understand and assess risk. Complexity
78 See Schwarcz, supra note 45, at 376-77.
79 See id. at 377.
80 See Schwarcz, supra note 49, at 220 & n.46.
81 The Dodd-Frank Act attempts to limit complexity in securitization transactions
by directing the SEC to require additional disclosure regarding the specific assets
backing each class of securitized securities and also to establish more standardized
disclosure formats. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 942-946, 124 Stat. 1376, 1896-98 (2010)
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
82 See Schwarcz, supra note 49, at 231.
83 For example, complex securities enable firms to raise low-cost financing while
investors are rewarded with higher returns and the ability to more precisely hedge
risk. See id. at 213.
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obfuscates risk in several ways. First, it creates an inherent informa-
tion asymmetry between the originator of a financial instrument and
the investor who purchases it. Second, the more complex the security
and its underlying financial assets, the more likely it will be that the
benefit gained from analysis will be, orat least will appear to be, out-
weighed by the costs. 84 Finally, individuals face cognitive constraints
in processing and using complex information effectively. For exam-
ple, the usefulness of mathematical models that attempt to value
financial instruments depends on being able to correctly specify the
variables that influence those instruments, identify their interrelation-
ships, and estimate results using historical data. As complexity
increases, financial models become less reliable. Complexity, there-
fore, increases the likelihood that financial firms will see little benefit
in conducting extensive diligence on the securities they purchase.
This will lead them to rely more heavily on simplifying heuristics, such
as credit ratings, as substitutes for their own analysis.8 5 Under such
conditions, firms are likely to underestimate the risk of remote shocks
to the financial condition of their portfolios because complexity
makes that risk less salient, more opaque, and more difficult to model.
2. Explaining Risk Transmission Through the Inter-Institutional
Correlation Among Financial Institutions
The discussion above focused on the tendency for financial firms
to underestimate the occurrence of low-probability shocks and the
resulting vulnerability that they suffer. Our second correlation-the
correlation among financial institutions-considers the ways in which
financial firms are interrelated within the financial system. By explor-
ing these interconnections we hope to account for how individual
firms affect each other, both through their direct linkages and
through their impact on financial markets. This perspective also per-
84 See id. at 221-23. Firms are also discouraged from engaging in due diligence
with regard to the risk underlying an asset since credit derivatives allow firms to
broadly disperse risk creating a collective action problem. See id. at 245, 258.
85 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Disclosure's Failure in the Subprine Mortgage Crisis, 3 UTAH
L. REV. 1109, 1114-15 (2008) (pointing out that rating agencies are also plagued by
the complexity of the securities they are assessing and by conflicts between the inter-
ests of employees and institutions). The Dodd-Frank Act attempts to strengthen the
integrity of rating agencies through measures relating to increased accountability,
internal controls, elimination of reliance on ratings by federal agencies, and public
disclosure of the information on which ratings are based. Implementation of many of
these measures has been left by Congress to regulations to be prescribed by the SEC.
See Dodd-Frank Act §§ 931-939H.
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mits us to consider the broader framework within which individual
firms assess the level, and pricing, of risk-taking.
a. Complexity Revisited
Complexity can also implicate the second correlation. The finan-
cial system is a complex "network" comprised of institutions, or
"nodes," that are both interconnected and interactive.8 6 Thinking of
the financial system in terms of a network highlights the potential for
shocks that originate at one node and travel to others through their
links. It also suggests the potential for the network to amplify an ini-
tial shock through, for example, positive feedback effects. A network
exhibiting positive feedback responds to an initial shock by increasing
the shock's magnitude. Symbolically, "A" leads to "B," which pro-
duces more of "A."87
The most straightforward way that financial firms are networked
is through direct contracts, such as derivatives, wherein the parties are
commonly referred to as "counterparties."'88 Derivatives, most notably
credit-default swaps (CDS), 9 allow firms to trade credit risks on a vari-
86 For a general review of international finance as a complex adaptive system, see,
for example, Lawrence G. Baxter, Internationalisation of Law-The 'Complex' Case of
Bank Regulation, in THE INTERNATIONALISATION oF LAwV 3 (Mary Hiscock & William van
Caenegem eds., 2010). See Brunnermeier, supra note 15, at 97-98; Ross A. Ham-
mond, Systemic Risk in the Financial System: Insights from Network Science 2 (Pew Fin.
Reform Project, Briefing Paper No. 12, 2009), available at http://www.pewfr.org/
admin/projectreports/files/EPHammondNetworks-final-TF-Correction.pdf
(explaining the role of nodes in the financial system). See generally Andrew G.
Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability, Bank of Eng., Speech Delivered at the Financial
Student Association: Rethinking the Financial Network 7 (Apr. 2009) (transcript avail-
able at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2009/speech386.
pdf) (analyzing the financial system through a network lens).
87 For example, an increase in property values leads to an increased supply of
mortgage capital, which in turn leads to increased property values. See Marcel Arsen-
ault & Liang Peng, Mortgage Fund Flows, Capital Appreciation, and Real Estate
Cycles 2-3 (Aug. 2009) (unpublished working paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1458188 (arguing that positive feedback loops
drive real estate cycles).
88 See Phelim Boyle & Feidhlim Boyle, Derivatives 7 (2001) (defining parties to a
contract, especially a derivatives contract, as counterparties).
89 In a credit-default swap, one party (the credit "seller") agrees, in exchange for
the payment to it of a fee by a second party (the credit "buyer"), to assume the credit
risk of certain debt obligations of a specified borrower or other obligor. If a "credit
event" (for example, default or bankruptcy) occurs in respect of that obligor, the
credit seller will either (a) pay the credit buyer an amount calculated by reference to
post-default value of the debt obligations or (b) buy the debt obligations (or other
eligible debt obligations of the obligor) for their full face value from the credit buyer.
See STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE § 10:3.1 (3d ed. 2002).
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ety of exposures. Because of these interconnecting contracts, bank-
ruptcy or other failure of a given market participant can cause that
participant to default on its obligations to other market participants,
who, in turn, may themselves be so harmed that they default on their
own obligations to market participants, leading to a domino-effect
collapse.90
The domino model of contagion describes a mechanism by which
shocks are transmitted directly between firms within a network, but it
does not capture the transmission of shocks among firms through the
indirect impact of their behavior on markets. Markets serve as
another mechanism through which shocks can have network-wide
effects. In a simple domino model of contagion, asset prices are
treated as fixed, and only counterparty default can affect the financial
condition of a firm.91 In a market-based financial system, however,
asset prices respond to the assets' perceived riskiness. Investors are
subject to "mark-to-market" or "fair value" accounting rules, requiring
them to adjust the value of their securities holdings for accounting
purposes to reflect their current market prices.9 2 An investor, for
example, may buy securities on credit from a securities broker-dealer,
securing repayment of the purchase price by pledging the securities as
collateral. To guard against the price of the securities falling to the
point where their value as collateral is insufficient to repay the
purchase price, the broker-dealer requires the investor to maintain a
minimum collateral value. If the market value of the securities falls
below this minimum, the broker-dealer will issue a "margin call"
requiring the investor to deposit additional collateral, usually in the
90 See Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 198-200; Schwarcz, supra note 49, at 235-36.
91 See MARKUS BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL
REGULATION 16 (2009).
92 Under fair value accounting (FVA), assets and liabilities are revalued to market
value at each balance sheet date. Fair value is generally defined as the most advanta-
geous price that a seller would receive to sell an asset or pay to transfer a liability in an
orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement date. FVA is
"arguably the most important and controversial issue facing regulators and account-
ing standard setters today." Doron Nissin & Stephen Penman, Principles for the Applica-
tion of Fair Value Accounting I (Columbia Bus. Sch. Ctr. for Excellence in Accounting &
Sec. Analysis, White Paper No. 2, 2008); see also David J. Emerson et al., Fair Value
Accounting: A Historical Review of the Most Controversial Accounting Issue in Decades, 8 J.
Bus. & ECON. RES. 77, 80-84 (2010) (examining the evolution of fair value account-
ing). The financial industry, as well as members of Congress, has blamed FVA for
contributing to the current financial crisis by exacerbating the impact of pro-cyclical-
ity (i.e., the exaggeration of upturns and downturns in the economy) in the markets.
Supporters of FVA argue that, because fair value accurately reflects current market




form of money or additional securities, to satisfy the minimum. Fail-
ure to do so triggers a default, enabling the broker-dealer to foreclose
on the collateral.9 3 As a result, firms subject to margin calls may be
forced to engage in asset "fire" sales, thereby depressing prices, requir-
ing more forced sales, and depressing prices even further, thus creat-
ing a positive feedback effect, or "loss spiral. '9 4
In highly complex financial markets in which firms are constantly
adjusting their risk exposures in the presence of information uncer-
tainty, systemic transmission of localized shocks need not even require
that firms be contractually linked or that they conduct "fire" sales.
Opaqueness, such as information uncertainty attributable to the indi-
rect holding system, 9 5 can lead to the transmission of a firm's
problems by making it impossible to identify the beneficial ownership
of specific securities. Unable to determine which institutions are
exposed to securities that have become distressed, market participants
may attribute those securities to similarly situated firms.96 Market par-
ticipants may, as a result, become reluctant to extend credit to other
financial market participants based on "similarity" concerns.9 7
Technological innovation can aggravate network effects within
the financial system by making financial markets more "temporally"
complex.9 8 Newly developed trading technologies have greatly
93 See Zvi BODIE ET AL., INVESTMENTS 78-79 (7th ed. 2008).
94 See Rodrigo Cifuentes et al., Liquidity Risk and Contagion 9 (Bank of Eng. Work-
ing Paper Series, Paper No. 264, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractjid=824166; see also Clifford De Souza & Mikhail Smirnov,
Dynamic Leverage: A Contingent Claims Approach to Leverage for Capital Conservation, 31 J.
PORTFOLIO MGMT. 25, 28 (2004) (arguing that, in a bad market, short-term pressure
to sell assets to raise cash for margin calls can lead to further mark-to-market losses for
remaining assets, which triggers a whole new wave of selling, the process repeating
itself until markets improve or the firm is wiped out, and referring to this process as a
"Critical Liquidation Cycle"). These spiraling events may well occur rapidly, within
days. See, e.g., Systemic Risk: Examining Regulators' Ability to Respond to Threats to the
Financial System: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 1 (2007) (state-
ment of Richard Bookstaber, Author) (observing the "tendency for the markets to
move rapidly into a crisis mode," and referring to this tendency, by analogy to engi-
neering, as "tight coupling").
95 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
96 In economic terms, this can be seen as a variant on adverse selection. See
George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons ": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mecha-
nism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 488 (1970) (describing the agency costs that arise when sell-
ers have better information regarding the quality of a good than buyers).
97 See Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis: The
Case for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 YALEJ. ON REG. (forthcoming 2011).
98 See Schwarcz, supra note 49, at 215, 232 (explaining that temporal complexity
exists within markets when events move too rapidly for there to be sufficient time or
opportunity for parties to intervene).
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increased the speed of processing and trading on information. High-
frequency algorithmic trading systems are now capable of analyzing
vast quantities of market data and transmitting thousands of order
messages per second. 99 They rely on computerized quantitative mod-
els that execute trades with little or no human involvement. 00 Reli-
ance on automated trading systems can aggravate loss spirals. For
example, because of the speed with which high-frequency algorithmic
trading occurs, erroneous trades can lead to substantial losses before
they are discovered. 101 In addition, if securities prices are subjected to
a negative initial shock, automated stop-loss orders could formulai-
cally trigger a chain reaction of selling without the time or opportu-
nity for human judgment to intervene.10 2 There is also the danger
that the interaction between automated trading systems may result in
disorderly markets. 103
99 See Carol L. Clark, Controlling Risk in a Lightning-Speed Trade Environment, CHI-
CAGO FED LETrER (Mar. 2010), http://www.chicagofed.org/digital-assets/publica-
tions/chicago fedjletter/2010/cflmarch20lO 272.pdf.
100 See id. There are now numerous ways in which a large trade can be executed,
allowing customers to choose how much human judgment is involved when executing
such a trade. See CFTC & SEC, FINDINGS REGARDING THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6,
2010, at 14 (2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/marketevents-
report.pdf.
101 See Tom Steinert-Threlkeld, Preventing the Two Minute Meltdown, SEC. TECH.
MONITOR, Aug. 3, 2009 (arguing that the next market meltdown could occur in two
minutes because high-frequency traders use new technology to execute trades at blaz-
ing speeds); see also Risk Management Controls for Brokers or Dealers with Market
Access, 75 Fed. Reg. 4009 (Jan. 26, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R pt. 240) (noting
that because of the speed of high-frequency trading, a malfunctioning algorithm
could enter $720 million worth of erroneous trades if there were a two minute delay
in detection).
102 A stop-loss order is a standing order designed to limit losses by automatically
selling a security if it falls to a certain price point. See CFTC & SEC, PRELIMINARY
FINDINGS REGARDING THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6, 2010, at 58 (2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/sec-cftc-prelimreport.pdf. It is possible for these orders to create
a domino effect because the triggering of one stop-loss order puts downward pressure
on the price of a security, which can lead to the triggering of another stop-loss order.
See id. at 5 ("[S]top loss market orders could potentially trigger a chain reaction of
automated selling if they are in place in significant quantity for a particular stock.");
Amir E. Khandani & Andrew W. Lo, What Happened to the Quants in August 2007?, 5J.
INVESTMENT MGMT 5, 6-7 (2007) (describing how downward pressure on stock prices
due to forced selling by quantitative hedge funds was exacerbated by stop-loss orders,
which caused further losses).
103 See CFTC & SEC, supra note 100, at 6; see also discussion infra note 204
(explaining the events of May 6, 2010).
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b. The Tragedy of the Commons
When making risk-taking decisions, firms are self-regarding.
Because of the interconnectivity among financial institutions, how-
ever, individual firm decisions have potential spillover effects. These
repercussions are an example of an externality. 10 4 Externalities can
give rise to a type of tragedy of the commons,10 5 most familiar in the
environmental setting but also relevant in financial markets. In the
latter case, the benefits of exploiting finite capital resources accrue to
individual market participants, each of whom is motivated to maxi-
mize use of the resource, whereas the costs of exploitation are distrib-
uted more widely. This can not only result in a failure to identify or
fully appreciate the correlations but also, more significantly, a failure
to fully appreciate the possibility that the correlations may combine to
produce a systemic crisis. The tragedy of the commons suggests that,
absent intervention, financial market participants will progressively
pursue their self-interest in the form of socially excessive risk-
taking. 106
The root of the commons problem in financial markets is the
asymmetry in the distribution of gains and losses associated with
investment decisions. As we discussed above, in assuming risk, a firm
exposes itself to the possibility that the return on its investment will
deviate from its long-run expected value, producing either a positive
or negative outcome. 10 7 In the case of a positive outcome, the firm
captures the full benefits of the investment's success. In the case of a
104 SeeJames M. Buchanan & Wm. Craig Stubblebine, Externality, 29 ECONOMICA
371, 372 (1962).
105 We call this a "type" of tragedy of the commons because it is not strictly a
tragedy of the commons in which all parties involved commonly suffer the externality
they cause. The classic example of a tragedy of the commons is an overgrazed pasture
resulting from common ownership so that no individual owner has the right to
exclude use by other owners. See generally Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons,
162 Sci. 1243, 1244 (1968) (discussing the tragedy of the commons problem in the
over-population context). The original concept of a tragedy of the commons can be
traced back to Aristotle. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICs 57 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Courier
Dover 2000) ("[T] hat which is common to the greatest number has the least care
bestowed upon it. Every one thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the common
interest.").
106 Accordingly, the tragedy of the commons can be viewed as a conflict between
individual firms and broader financial-market interests. See Patricia A. McCoy et al.,
Systemic Risk Through Securitization: The Result of Deregulation and Regulatory Failure, 41
CONN. L. REv. 493, 532 (2009) (noting that one of the surprising phenomena of the
expansion of non-prime mortgage lending from 2002-2006 was that "as systemic risk
increased, risk premia did not").
107 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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negative outcome, however, the firm may not suffer the full conse-
quences of the poor investment. Rather, if the firm fails or merely
defaults, those consequences will impact financial market participants
that rely on the soundness of the firm's financial condition. Further-
more, if the firm is deemed too systemically significant to fail, its losses
may be absorbed by the government as a lender of last resort. In
either case, the un-internalized costs associated with risk-taking by
firms leads them to overexploit scarce capital resources in the form of
socially excessive risk-taking.
The commons problem can be even further exacerbated where
competition makes socially excessive risk-taking essential to maintain-
ing market share. This collective action problem was captured by
Chuck Prince, former chairman and CEO of Citigroup, prior to the
recent global financial crisis: "When the music stops, in terms of
liquidity, things will be complicated. But as long as the music is play-
ing, you've got to get up and dance. We're still dancing." 108 To avoid
being marginalized by losing market share, firms have an incentive to
take the same risks as other firms. Doing so increases systemic risk,
but much of that harm is externalized, making it rational-viewed
from the standpoint of their shareholders-for firms to dance too
frenziedly and remain on the dance floor too long.' 0 9
B. Future Impediments to Financial Market Self-Regulation
Many of the reasons for which financial market participants have
failed to address the correlations (which, we have argued, can com-
bine to propagate economic shocks within and among financial insti-
tutions) are likely to continue. Indeed, as explained below, we believe
they will become even more pronounced in the future.
Complexity is certainly likely to continue, if not grow. Profit
opportunities, for example, are inherent in complexity. This is due in
part to investor demand for securities that more precisely match their
risk and reward preferences. It is also due to regulatory arbitrage.
Regulatory arbitrage refers to the exploitation of differential treat-
ment of financial transactions by alternative regulatory regimes in
order to enhance returns.110 Financial, tax, and accounting rules
108 Michio Nakayama & David Wighton, Citigroup Chief Stays Bullish on Buy-outs,
FIN. TIMES (July 9, 2007), http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?newsid=fto07O9
20071725183786.
109 Indeed, viewed from the standpoint of their shareholders, it would be irrational
for firms not to dance too frenziedly and remain on the dance floor too long.
110 See Frank Partnoy, Financial Derivatives and the Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage, 22 J.
CORP. L. 211, 227 (1997); Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage 3 (Univ. of Colo. Law
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often apply varying treatment to activities that possess roughly the
same economic substance. I1 ' By manipulating the form of a transac-
tion, firms can take advantage of these inconsistent regulatory
regimes.
Complexity is also a feature of the means by which financial firms
develop new products. For example, mortgage securitization transac-
tions originated to bridge the desire of homebuyers for affordable
mortgage loans with the desire of investors for enhanced returns.1 1 2
Over time, many other types of assets have become the basis for securi-
tizations, and investment banks and other underwriters and arrangers
have generated considerable fees for developing these financial
products.
Technological advances may also increase complexity. Professor
Henry Hu described the potential dark side of the impact on financial
markets of increasing sophistication as "science run amok,.., a finan-
cial Jurassic Park," 113 in which,
[i]n the face of relentless competition and capital market dis-
intermediation, big financial institutions [hire] financial scientists
to develop new financial products. Often operating in an interna-
tional wholesale market open only to major corporate and sover-
eign entities-a loosely regulated paradise hidden from public
view-these scientists push the frontier, relying on powerful com-
puters and esoteric models laden with incomprehensible Greek
letters.114
The "new-product generation machines" of investment banks,
hedge funds, and other firms have been, and are likely to continue to
be, better staffed and stronger than the structures that oversee their
Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 10-11, 2010), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1 567212.
111 See Establishing a Framework for Systemic Risk Regulation: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 47 (2009) (statement of Vin-
cent Reinhart, Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute).
112 See ScHwARcz, supra note 89, § 1.2.
113 Over-the-Counter Derivatives: Modernizing Oversight to Increase Transparency and
Reduce Risks: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins. & Inv. of the S. Comm. on Banking,
Hous. & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 25 (2009) (statement of Henry T.C. Hu, Allan
Shivers Chair in the Law of Banking and Finance, University of Texas School of Law).
In September 2009, the SEC announced the appointment of Professor Hu as the first
Director of the newly created Division of Risk, Strategy, and Financial Innovation.
114 Id.
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operations. 115 This suggests a further motivation for greater product
complexity: to elude regulation.
New technologies are likely to continue to add complexity not
only to financial products but also to financial markets. We have
referred to the financial system as a "network" that connects institu-
tions, or "nodes," with one another, serving to transmit economic
shocks.1 16  Over time, innovations in financial products have
increased the linkages between nodes. 117 In addition, new communi-
cations technologies have accelerated the speed with which signals
travel between them. 1 8 High levels of connectivity, combined with
greater speed in the transmission of data, tend to increase the likeli-
hood that local disturbances will rapidly produce network-wide
effects. 1 19
While the level of complexity within the financial system is likely
to intensify, complacency is likely to persist. Human nature is
ingrained and difficult to change. For example, as a result of availabil-
ity bias, 120 we are all too susceptible to overestimating the frequency
or likelihood of an event when examples of, or associations with, simi-
lar events are easily brought to mind.12' Immediately after a crisis,
people may well focus on avoiding that particular type of crisis in the
future, but once the crisis loses its immediacy we quickly tend to for-
get its lessons. Not surprisingly, then, when past financial crises
recede in memory, investors almost always "go for the gold," in the
sense of seeking higher rates of return in lieu of protection from
risk.122 Increasingly, as risk is analyzed using more sophisticated
quantitative techniques, behavioral biases become embedded in finan-
115 See Alan Murray, Getting Started: Sir Howard Davies of the London School of Econom-
ics and Political Science Offers Action Items for Fixing the Financial System, WALL ST. J., Dec.
14, 2009, at R4.
116 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
117 See Haldane, supra note 86, at 22.
118 SeeJoy A. Schwartzman, The Game of 'Pass the Risk: Then and Now, in RISK MAN-
AGEMENT 72, 72 (2008), available at http://www.soa.org/library/essays/rm-essay-2008-
schwartzman.pdf.
119 See Michael J. Naylor et al., A Network Theory of Financial Cascades 21-22
(Jul. 23, 2008) (unpublished working paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1184604&rec=1 &srcabs=1089357.
120 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
121 See Slovic et al., supra note 72, at 463, 465.
122 See Larry Light, Bondholder Beware: Value Subject to Change Without Notice, BusI-
NESSWEEK, Mar. 29, 1993, at 34 (discussing empirical data showing that investors favor
higher interest rates over "event risk" covenants, once the examples of events justify-
ing the covenants have receded in memory). "Bondholders can-and will-fuss all
they like. But the reality is, their options are limited: Higher returns or better protec-
tion. Most investors will continue to go for the gold." Id. This will particularly be the
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cial models. Where a low-probability risk cannot be measured statisti-
cally, it is sometimes treated as zero in the model's computations. 123
This approach is consistent with best practices for modeling low-
probability events such as value-at-risk (VaR). 124 Thus, low-probability
events are likely to continue to be ignored in mathematical models,
thereby creating at least a perception that they should likewise be
ignored in reality. 125
Conflicts of interest within financial firms are also likely to con-
tinue, at least in the absence of government intervention. I 26 Individ-
ual firms will be unable to solve the collective-action problem that
employing a compensation scheme intended to avoid conflicts, such
as paying deferred or contingent compensation, entails. Implement-
ing such measures is likely to disadvantage firms in their ability to
compete for the best managers. 127 Moreover, the increasing competi-
case, as a result of the herd instinct, when other investors are acting in this manner.
See Schwarcz, supra note 41, at 566.
123 See Joe Nocera, Risk Mismanagement: Were the Measures Used to Evaluate Wall Street
Trades Flawed?, N.Y. TIMES MAC., Jan. 4, 2009, at 24, 46; infra note 167.
124 VaR represents the expected maximum loss (the "value at risk") of a portfolio
over a given time horizon within a specified confidence interval. For example, if the
daily VaR of a portfolio is twenty-five million dollars at the ninety-nine percent confi-
dence level, there is only a one-in-a-hundred chance that it will suffer a loss greater
than twenty-five million dollars over a one-day holding period. See PHILIPPE JOPICON,
VALUE AT RISK 49, 76 (3d ed. 2007) (explaining the meaning of VaR). Properly
understood, VaR is a valuable approach to risk measurement. As the VaR model
became more accepted, however, analysts began to apply it beyond its intended uses.
See Peter Conti-Brown, Note, A Proposed Fat-Tail Risk Metric: Disclosure, Derivatives, and
the Measurement ofFinancial Risk, 87 WASH. U. L. REv. 1461, 1469 (2010); see also Sergey
Sarykalin et al., Value-at-Risk vs. Conditional Value-at-Risk in Risk Management and
Optimization, in TUTORIALS IN OPERATIONS RESEARCH 2008, at 270, 271 (Zhi-Long Chen
& S. Raghavan eds., 2008), available at http://www.ise.ufl.edu/uryasev/VaR-vs-CVaR
_INFORMS.pdf (explaining how VaR's disregarding of extreme tails may be a good
property and contributes to its reputation for providing more stable estimates).
125 Cf Kimberly D. Krawiec, Operational Risk Management: An Emergent Industry, in
OPERATIONAL RISK TowARD BASEL 1II 271, 286 (Greg N. Gregoriou ed., 2009) ("[T]he
incentives fostered by [the] Basel 1I [Capital Accords] to create a numerical measure
of... risk may cause a focus on those aspects of... risk most easily quantified-the
high-frequency, low-impact events . . . -rather than on the more challenging and
elusive aspects of [risk] that may pose the greatest threat to financial institutions.").
126 See Schwarcz, supra note 67, at 468-69 (arguing that government intervention
may be required for firms to align compensation incentives with their long term inter-
ests, since firms are unlikely to act individually).
127 See id.
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tion of firms worldwide for top managers 28 makes it increasingly
likely that the collective-action problem will become global.
Finally, there is no reason to believe that individual market par-
ticipants will cease over-exploiting finite capital resources, imposing
externalities on each other and on the general public in the pro-
cess.129 Attempts at cooperative behavior in the form of more pru-
dent risk-taking will be met with cheating in the form of less prudent
risk-taking. The knowledge that if one firm behaves prudently its
competitors will not creates incentives for all firms to take excessive
risks.
It therefore appears that the correlations we have identified as
capable of transmitting systemic risk are likely to persist, and that
increasing complexity in the financial system will make them even
more pervasive and impervious to market-participant correction. Rec-
ognizing this, though, does not necessarily address whether the corre-
lations are likely to combine in the future, for it is their combination
that is systemically dangerous.130 Because the correlations are inde-
pendent, the likelihood of their combining should be as random in
the future as in the past. Thei-efore, to the extent the correlations
become more pervasive, their combination should follow a similar
path. The correlations are thus likely to continue to become even
more systemically dangerous than they have been historically.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR REGULATING SYSTEMIC RISK
In the preceding discussion, we described a framework in which
two correlations in the financial system can combine to produce sys-
temic economic effects from local shocks. We also identified a series
of interrelated factors-conflicts, complacency, and complexity, as
well as a type of tragedy of the commons-that helps to explain why
market participants are unlikely to address these correlations on their
own. Finally, we argued that the correlations are likely to continue to
exist in the future and, indeed, become even more pronounced. The
correlations are therefore likely to remain systemically significant as a
mechanism for transmitting localized adverse economic shocks.
128 See Claudio Ferndndez-Ardoz, The Coming Fight for Executive Talent, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 25, 2009), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/09
_49/b4158080830272.htm?chan=magazine+channelbusiness+views (discussing the
shortage of top executive talent and the increasing competition of firms worldwide
for the best managers).
129 Cf. supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text (discussing risk-taking decisions
as a type of tragedy of the commons).
130 See discussion supra Part I.A.
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The recent global financial crisis highlighted the role of govern-
ment in responding to systemic failure. In this capacity, the U.S. gov-
ernment, for example, has provided liquidity to help prevent banks
and other critical financial firms from defaulting and to help prevent
defaulting critical financial firms from failing. To a limited extent, it
has also provided liquidity to capital markets to attempt to keep them
functioning. 31 Avoiding systemic collapse is an important public risk-
management function in a free-market economy, an inevitable feature
of which is failure. But to the extent that avoiding systemic collapse
entails large-scale risk absorption by government, there are enormous
direct and indirect costs, including fostering potential moral hazard
by financial firms that may be deemed too big to fail. 132 Another
potential role for a regulator is to help safeguard against systemic cri-
ses, as opposed to merely addressing them after they occur, in circum-
stances in which market participants cannot be counted on to do so.
Our purpose in Part III is twofold. First, we seek to demonstrate
that the factors that help explain why the private sector has not acted
to constrain the transmission of systemic risk can be associated with
specific behavioral and other market failures. Second, we wish to
identify available policy tools for correcting such failures, which can
be used by regulators to encourage firms to manage risk more pru-
dently from a systemic standpoint. Importantly, our analysis is moti-
vated by our belief that regulatory intervention in financial markets is
justified by the inability of the marketplace to achieve allocative effi-
ciency on its own.1 33 For government regulation to enhance social
welfare, it must correct a market failure.134 Outside of such circum-
stances, market participants would rationally trade off risk and return,
131 See infra notes 211-13 and accompanying text.
132 See IMF, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT (2010), available at http://www.
imf.org/ external/ pubs/ft/ gfsr/ 201 0/ 01/ pdf/ text.pdf.
133 An allocation of resources is economically efficient if resources cannot be real-
located so as to make one person better off without making another person worse off.
See IvAN PNG & DALE LEHMAN, MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS 145 (3d ed. 2007). Market
failure occurs when a market fails to allocate resources efficiently. See PAUL A. SAMU-
ELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 756 (15th ed. 1995) (defining market
failure as "an imperfection in a price system that prevents an efficient allocation of
resources").
134 See PNG & LEHMAN, supra note 133, at 414. Because regulation can be costly,
efficiency also demands that the costs of regulation not exceed its benefits. See
Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 208-09; see also Charles K. Whitehead, Destructive Coordina-
tion, 96 CORNELL L. REv. 323, 330 (2011) (pointing out that regulation itself produces
systemic costs in the form of coordination's collective impact on financial markets).
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and financial crises would serve as mechanisms for punishing exces-
sive risk-taking.' 3 5
A. Managing the Correlation Between Low-Probability Risk and
Institutional Integrity
Our first correlation posits a relationship between the occurrence
of a low-probability adverse shock and the integrity of a financial firm.
In theory, a firm should address this correlation by managing risk effi-
ciently, eliminating or consensually transferring risks that it is not in
the best position to bear.136 As for those risks it can bear efficiently, it
should charge an appropriate premium. 137 We argued in Part II.A,
however, that a series of interrelated factors (conflicts, complacency,
complexity, and a type of tragedy of the commons) explains why man-
agers overexpose their businesses to low-probability adverse shocks.
We now advance responses to the behavioral and other market fail-
ures associated with these factors.
1. Regulating Conflicts
We have argued that conflicts of interest between a firm's manag-
ers and other stakeholders of the firm lead managers to take excessive
risks with their firm's assets. Specifically, in the presence of these con-
flicts, managers are incentivized to assume more risk on behalf of the
firm than other stakeholders would like. Conflicts of interest between
a firm's managers and its non-manager shareholders can arise, for
example, when there is an information asymmetry in the managerial
labor market.138 Markets in which there are differences in informa-
tion between buyers and sellers are not as efficient as those in which
buyers and sellers have symmetric information. 139 In the presence of
symmetric information, buyers and sellers are subject to competition.
If, for example, a seller of a product attempts to increase profits by
lowering quality, then buyers will switch to other sellers. Sellers are
thus constrained from exploiting private information.
135 See Korinek, supra note 10, at 2.
136 See Kaen, supra note 14, at 470.
137 Firms have different comparative advantages in dealing with different risks. See
id.; see also Ren6 M. Stulz, Rethinking Risk Management, 9 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 8,
14-16 (1996) (arguing that firms should exploit any comparative advantage in risk-
bearing).
138 See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & KevinJ. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Manage-
ment Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225, 254 (1990) (arguing that disclosure of executive
compensation can help deter self-interested behavior).
139 See supra note 96.
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Information is not symmetric in the market for senior corporate
managers. Shareholders, for example, cannot observe directly the
behavior of CEOs. Their inability to do so is due primarily to the sepa-
ration of ownership and control in publicly held corporations with
diffuse ownership, which are governed by a centralized board of direc-
tors. Directors, in turn, are only weakly beholden to shareholders.
140
The information asymmetry is even greater for secondary managers,
who not only are further removed from shareholder control than
senior managers but also often have jobs that are so technical that
senior managers cannot effectively evaluate their performance.
The agency problem, whereby managers have substantial leeway
to pursue their private interests at the expense of shareholder value, is
a direct consequence of information asymmetry.' 4 ' Because of it,
managers can extract economic rents from shareholders. One way
they can do this is by pursuing high-risk strategies that inure to the
benefit of managers if they succeed but inure to the detriment of
shareholders, as well as managers, if they fail. In the absence of mar-
ket imperfections, shareholders would be able to both observe such
self-interested behavior and to act on it by switching their relation-
ships to better-managed firms. Managers would therefore be com-
pelled to behave in the best interests of shareholders. The
informational failure that, we contend, allows conflicts of interest to
persist in managerial labor markets informs our policy recommenda-
tions for better aligning the interests of the managers and sharehold-
ers of financial firms. These recommendations fall broadly into three
categories: pay-risk disclosure, board-of-director fiduciary duties, and
risk-sharing.
Although shareholders cannot directly observe the behavior of
managers, they can influence managerial behavior by making mana-
gerial pay depend on performance measures that shareholders can
observe. Compensation arrangements are a powerful influence on
managerial decision-making. Programs that insulate managers from
poor performance, link their rewards primarily to short-term metrics,
or set performance criteria unreasonably high may provide managers
with incentives for excessive risk-taking from the point of view of the
firm's shareholders. Enhanced disclosure is a tool that can be used to
encourage firms to adopt compensation arrangements that align man-
140 See George W. Dent, Jr., For Optional Federal Incorporation, 35 J. CoRP. L. 499,
500 (2010) (pointing out that although, in theory, directors are responsive to share-
holders, in practice, CEOs dominate boards).
141 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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agerial incentives with the long-term interests of their firms.1 4 2 Recog-
nizing this, the SEC recently amended its compensation disclosure
rules under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934143 to require discus-
sion of compensation as it relates to risk management. 44 The disclo-
sure is required to the extent that risks arising from a company's
compensation policies and practices for its employees, including non-
executive officers, are "reasonably likely" to have a material adverse
effect on the company. 145
Such a high threshold for disclosing "pay risk" is unlikely, how-
ever, to elicit meaningful disclosure. 146 More complete disclosure
would better serve shareholders in two respects. First, it would
require boards of directors to consider the relationship between com-
pensation and incentives for risk-taking at both the senior and secon-
dary management levels of their firms. This type of disclosure would
also better enable shareholders to monitor the incentives that shape
decision-making within the firm through advisory votes on executive
pay packages.' 47
For disclosure to solve the conflicts problem, persons receiving
the disclosure must be able to use it to influence the actions of deci-
sionmakers through consent requirements or market actions based on
the information provided to them. The complexity of disclosure, cog-
nitive biases, and collective action problems, however, conspire to
make it unlikely that investors will make full use of disclosure. 4 3 We
142 See Betty Simkins & Steven A. Ramirez, Enterprise-Wide Risk Management and Cor-
porate Governance, 39 Lov. U. CHI. L.J. 571, 586-87 (2008).
143 Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
144 SEC Proxy Disclosure Enhancements Rule, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.401-.402, .407
(2010).
145 Id. § 229.407. The Dodd-Frank Act directs the SEC to issue rules that require
companies to disclose in any proxy or consent solicitation material for an annual
shareholder meeting a "clear description" of any executive compensation arrange-
ment required to be disclosed by Item 402 of Regulation S-K, including the relation-
ship between executive compensation actually paid and a company's financial
performance. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 953, 124 Stat. 1376,
1903-04 (2010).
146 See Janet L. Fisher et al., Compensation and Risk: Practical Considerations for the
Compensation Committee, 24 INSIGHTs 2, 2 (2010).
147 Publicly-traded U.S. corporations must give shareholders a "say on pay" by
including in any proxy, consent, or authorization for any shareholder meeting for
which the SEC mandates compensation disclosure a separate nonbinding resolution
subject to shareholder vote to approve the company's executive compensation as dis-
closed in those materials. See Dodd-Frank Act § 951.
148 See Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences
for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 419 (2003) (exploring the effect of
cognitive limitations on investor decisionmaking).
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therefore believe that disclosure must be supplemented by measures
that either reduce information asymmetries between parties who
make risk-bearing decisions in the first instance and those who will
ultimately bear the risk, or mitigate the consequences of those
asymmetries. 14 9
Acknowledging the limits of disclosure's disciplinary force, corpo-
rate law also constrains managerial behavior through the law of fiduci-
ary duty. Directors are generally charged with managing their firms in
the best interests of shareholders.1 50 Because the board is a central-
ized decision-making unit, it does not face the collective action prob-
lem that shareholders confront as monitors of firm conduct.1 51
Directors can cause their firms to both establish and implement
appropriate risk-management programs. Recent case law has sug-
gested that excessive risk-taking by firms might violate a board's
responsibility to monitor the firm under its fiduciary duty of loyalty.1 52
Thus, fiduciary duty law can play a valuable role in constraining exces-
sive managerial risk-taking. 153 Whether it will in fact do so depends in
large part on the evolution of the jurisprudence in this area. A more
direct approach to constraining the extent to which information asym-
metries leave room for managers to take excessive risks is to align the
incentives of managers and shareholders by requiring managers to
place"skin in the game"-i.e., sharing at least some portion of the risk
149 To this end, the Dodd-Frank Act requires regulators to establish rules prohibit-
ing certain financial institutions with assets of one billion dollars or more from using
incentive-based compensation that could encourage inappropriate risks, and requir-
ing those financial institutions to disclose to the applicable regulators incentive-based
compensation arrangements that could lead to material financial losses. See Dodd-
Frank Act § 956.
150 See, e.g., ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAw §§ 3.4-7.9, at 123-262
(1986) (describing at length the duties of officers and directors); cf Steven L.
Schwarcz, Rethinking a Corporation's Obligations to Creditors, 17 CARDozo L. REv. 647,
654 (1996) (analyzing the question of a corporation's fiduciary obligation to
creditors).
151 Cf infra notes 173-77 and accompanying text (describing the advantages of
centralized risk-assessment by rating agencies).
152 See In re Citigroup, Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 123 (Del. Ch.
2009). Such cases implicate the duty of oversight of the board of directors, as estab-
lished by In re Caremark International, Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch.
1996), and its progeny. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Man-
agement, 34J. CoRP. L. 967, 968 (2009) (suggesting that although cases in which plain-
tiffs have brought Careinark claims typically involve compliance, there is no doctrinal
reason that such claims should not also lie in cases involving lax risk management).
153 In recognition of this role, the Dodd-Frank Act increases independence
requirements for members of a board's compensation committee. See Dodd-Frank
Act § 952.
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of loss associated with their actions. By linking pay to long-term per-
formance, management incentives can be aligned more closely with
the interests of owners.1 54
The specific design of a compensation scheme intended to
apportion risk to managers depends on whose interests are being pur-
sued. With respect to banks, Lucian Bebchuk and Holger Spamann
have argued that a compelling case exists for thinking of the princi-
pals of financial firms more broadly than as only common sharehold-
ers. 155 In non-financial firms, shareholder value maximization is
generally viewed as appropriate. 56 Bebchuk and Spamann contend
that executive compensation at banks should be designed with the
interests of not only common shareholders but also other contribu-
tors to bank capital, including preferred shareholders and
debtholders. This view stems from the recognition that the govern-
ment has a special interest in banks as guarantor (of the banks and
their depositors), senior investor, and liquidity provider of last resort.
More generally, it would be appropriate to tie executive compensation
to a weighted basket of the firms' securities constructed to represent
the constituencies whose interests financial regulators deem those
firms' executives to be serving. Alignment is difficult to achieve, how-
ever, because individual firms that attempt to align incentives will be
disadvantaged in their ability to compete for the best managers.' 57
Hence, regulation may well be needed to help resolve this collective-
action problem. 158
2. Regulating Complacency
Decisionmakers, even non-conflicted ones, are not always the
purely rational actors that classical economic theory assumes them to
be. Behavioral research provides an account of human decisionmak-
ing in which individuals are subject to systematic perceptions and
154 Requiring managers to bear risk in their compensation arrangements involves
a cost. This cost arises because risk-averse managers must be paid a premium in
exchange for accepting an element of risk as part of their compensation. See Brian J.
Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, Stock Options for Undiversified Executives, 33J. Accr. & ECON. 3,
12-13 (2002). Performance-based pay arrangements must therefore balance the
gains from improved incentive alignment against the incremental compensation that
managers require in order to bear risk.
155 See Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 69, at 278-86.
156 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARv. L.
REV. 833, 892 (2005) (describing the objective of corporate governance as the
enhancement of shareholder value).
157 See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
158 See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
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processes that do not produce rational choices. These results suggest
that policymakers ought to consider behavioral biases in the context
of regulatory design. 159 Just as market-failure theory provides a foun-
dation for regulatory intervention in markets, so too does behavioral
theory.160  In other words, regulation should be "behaviorally
informed.'1 61
In Part II.A, we described how an appreciation of cognitive biases
can help account for why managers at financial firms tend to underes-
timate the risk of occurrence of low-probability adverse events. When
these biases become embedded in the risk-management techniques of
firms they can become even more potent because end-users of the
techniques are not always sensitive to the assumptions on which they
are based.1 62 Appreciating the role that cognitive biases can play in
159 See RIcHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 4-14 (2008); Cass R. Sun-
stein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1159, 1162-63 (2003) (describing libertarian paternalism as policies designed to
influence people's behavior in individually welfare-enhancing ways, while at the same
time preserving their freedom of choice); see also Russell Korobkin, Libertarian Welfar-
ism, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1651, 1653 (2009) (extending the principle of libertarian pater-
nalism to the goal of social welfare maximization); Daniel Schwarcz, Regulating
Consumer Demand in Insurance Markets, 3 ERASMUS L. REv. 23, 25 (2010) (considering
libertarian-paternalistic approaches to improving insurance markets).
160 See EDWARD J. BALLEISEN & DAVID A. Moss, GOVERNMENT AND MARKETS 21
(2010); see also Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35J. LEGAL
STUD. 199, 200-01 (2006) (drawing attention to the potential for legal rules to pro-
mote more rational behavior). But see Anne C. Dailey, Imagination and Choice, 35 LAW
& Soc. INQUIRY 175, 177 (2010) (pointing out the psychoanalytic limits to attempts to
debias individuals).
161 See Michael S. Barr et al., The Case for Behaviorally Informed Regulation, in NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION 25, 25-63 (David Moss & John Cisternino eds., 2009)
(discussing behavioral perspective of human behavior and its policy implications).
On the other hand, we are mindful that reforms intended to redress behavioral
imperfections may themselves introduce biases into decisionmaking and must there-
fore be introduced with caution. SeeJennifer Arlen, Comment: The Future of Behavioral
Economic Analysis of Law, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1765, 1769 (1998).
162 Despite its limitations, for example, the value-at-risk (VaR) model for measur-
ing risk became an acceptable method for calculating bank regulatory capital require-
ments. See DANIEL K. TARULLO, BANKING ON BASEL 63 (2008). Banks responded by
focusing investment portfolios to concentrate more on securities, such as MBS and
credit-default swaps, that generated frequent gains and rare, but extreme, losses.
Because the likelihood of these losses was less than the risk percentages taken into
account under VaR modeling-which typically excludes losses that have less than a
one percent (or, in some cases, five percent) likelihood of occurring within the
model's limited time frame-such losses were not included in the VaR computations.
Analysts knew, but did not always make clear to senior management, that in the rare
cases where such losses occurred, their magnitude could be huge. See Schwarcz, supra
note 49, at 224-25.
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risk-related decision making should lead regulators to take measures
to encourage financial firms to address weaknesses in identifying,
measuring, and controlling risks within their organizations.1 63
Matters such as the level of a firm's in-house risk expertise, the
authority of its risk managers, and the way in which its board monitors
risk all bear on the sophistication and effectiveness with which an
organization addresses risks. Anecdotal evidence from the global
financial crisis suggests that during the economic expansion in the
United States that occurred between 2002 and 2007, risk managers
were ineffective in their efforts to curb risk-taking within their organi-
zations.164 If, as we have suggested, cognitive biases undermine indi-
viduals' appreciation of low-probability risks, particularly during
periods of sustained economic growth, then it should not be surpris-
ing that risk managers are often marginalized. Because risk managers
are likely to be the individuals within an organization most sensitized
to cognitive biases, the situational environment within which risk man-
agers operate should be reformed with a view toward giving them suf-
ficient independence and authority to effectively challenge risk-takers
within their firms.
More broadly, in carrying out its supervisory and regulatory
responsibilities, regulators can incorporate a behavioral perspective
into their oversight of risk-taking. For example, firms could be asked
to specify risks that are not fully captured by internal models. Risks
that are not possible to address using quantitative approaches should
be analyzed qualitatively. The supervisory process already allows regu-
lators to evaluate a firm's risk-management systems using scenario
163 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, established by the central-bank
governors of the Group of Ten countries in 1974 to promulgate standards for bank-
ing guidelines, takes a risk-focused approach to supervision and regulation, with the
goal of improving, and encouraging banks to focus on, risk management. (The Com-
mittee's conclusions and recommendations do not have the force of law but are
intended to formulate broad supervisory standards and guidelines of best practice in
the expectation that individual authorities will implement them on the basis of their
own needs.) In doing so, however, it allows qualifying banks to generate their own
estimates of the probability of default of credit portfolios for purposes of determining
their associated capital requirements. See TARULLO, supra note 162, at 6. In theory, a
capital-requirement approach based on the internal ratings of a firm should be more
accurate than an approach based on standardized risk groupings, whereby all bank
assets are assigned to categories and capital requirements assigned to them. On the
other hand, cognitive failures can undermine the accuracy of internal assessments of
credit risks.
164 See Viral V. Acharya et al., Corporate Governance in the Modern Financial Sector, in




analysis and stress testing techniques. 165 These simulation exercises
help to expose weaknesses in risk-management, but they depend on
the choice of scenarios simulated and on assumptions about how
returns on different assets behave under the scenarios. "Reminding"
managers of historically relevant negative economic shocks is likely to
encourage firms to engage in more critical reflection and provide
more accurate assessments of risk.
3. Regulating Complexity
The complexities that have come to characterize financial prod-
.ucts and markets can, even in the absence of conflicts of interest or
complacency, prevent financial markets from operating efficiently by
producing information uncertainty through two avenues. The first
relates to the ability of financial market participants to fully appreciate
the low-probability risks inherent in complex financial products. This
aspect of complexity can be thought of as cognizant complexity-
things are just too complex to understand. 166 Cognizant complexity
gives rise to an information asymmetry between originators and pur-
chasers of financial instruments, which can potentially be addressed
through transparency and disclosure. Better access to information
cannot respond completely to cognizant complexity, however,
because individuals face cognitive constraints in processing and using
complex information effectively.1 6 7
The second avenue through which complexity produces informa-
tion uncertainty relates to people's willingness to undertake the costs
necessary to become informed about and assess the low-probability
165 In fact, the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program, better known as the stress
tests, was conducted by the Federal Reserve to assess capital adequacy under alterna-
tive macroeconomic scenarios in 2009.
166 See Schwarcz, supra note 41, at 563-64. Social psychology uses a related term,
.cognitive complexity," to refer to different people perceiving the same phenomena
on different levels of complexity. Some people tend to notice more and thus have a
more nuanced view of a given phenomena, whereas others notice less and therefore
have a simplified view. SeeJON E. ROECKELEIN, DICTIONARY OF THEORIES, LAWS, AND
CONCEPTS IN PSYCHOLOGY 98-99 (1998).
167 See Paredes, supra note 148, at 419; Schwarcz, supra note 85, at 1121-22; Steven
L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L.
REv. 1, 4-6. The limitations of cognitive complexity may help to explain the inability
of even financial analysts and other "experts" to see at least some of the correlations
in the recent financial crisis. As the complexity of financial products increased, fewer
analysts possessed sufficiently nuanced cognition to properly understand and price
the products. Trying to do theirjobs, many analysts made oversimplifications, usually
on the optimistic side because the economy was expanding. See Schwarcz, supra note
49, at 224.
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risks embedded in complex securities. Financial products are contin-
ually evolving, and even sophisticated investors can find it challenging
to anticipate product behavior under different assumptions.1 68 Gain-
ing product information is also resource-intensive: At some point, the
cost of conducting incremental analysis on a complex structure will
outweigh the benefit expected to be obtained from it. When risk is
highly dispersed, this point can occur very early on in the due dili-
gence process.169
Regardless of why complexity prevents financial participants from
obtaining full information about financial products, the information
lacuna contributes to the correlation between low-probability risk and
firm integrity. One possible response is standardization, whereby reg-
ulators require securities to be traded through exchanges or similar
institutions that list securities with specified characteristics. 170 Stand-
ardization would render financial products more cognizable, so that
prospective purchasers would better understand their features.' 7' It
would also reduce the cost to investors of familiarizing themselves with
the operation of new securities. The overall economic impact of
standardization is unclear, however, because standardization would
interfere with the ability of parties to achieve the efficiencies that arise
when issuing firms tailor securities to the particular needs of investors
by providing a variety of options relating to risk, return, and timing of
cash flows. It is therefore preferable to address complexity through
supplemental protections that do not interfere with the ability of mar-
168 Indeed, sophisticated investors suffered the greatest losses in the global finan-
cial crisis. See Schwarcz, supra note 49, at 243.
169 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
170 The Dodd-Frank Act requires only derivatives subject to mandatory clearing to
be traded on an exchange or swap execution facility. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 723(a)(8), 124 Stat. 1376, 1681-82 (2010). The legislation further
requires that derivatives clear through a clearinghouse, but only provided that a
clearinghouse will accept a trade for clearing. See id. § 956; infra note 190. However,
because clearinghouses generally require a high degree of standardization in the
derivatives they clear, market participants can continue trading customized derivatives
in opaque markets without the benefits of price transparency to which standardized
contracts are subject. See Matthew Goldstein, Derivatives and the Blizzard of Paperwork,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (May 15, 2009), http://www.businessweek.com/investing/
wallstreetnews-blog/archives/2009/05/derivatives_and.html ("[A] large percent-
age of derivatives are non-standard instruments ....").
171 See Scorrj. Moss, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF BUSINESS STRATEGY 121 (1981) ("A
commodity is cognizable if its physical specifications will be known and understood
with precision by prospective purchasers, who will not have seen the units they
purchase prior to assuming ownership and taking delivery of them. If a particular




ket participants to design financial products that respond to or antici-
pate investor needs. 172
An alternative to standardization as a response to complexity is
centralization of risk assessment. Like standardization, centralization
allows individuals or firms to achieve a better cognitive grasp of finan-
cial products. However, centralization does not rely on constraining
the available range of securities in the financial marketplace. Rather,
it concentrates expertise. At the same time, centralization produces
cost efficiencies in the production of research and analysis through
specialization and economies of scale. Centralization can therefore
result in approaches to, and levels of, due diligence that would be
uneconomic for dispersed investors to undertake.
Rating agencies offer one possibility for centralized risk assess-
ment. They are in a unique position to observe, analyze, and assess
financial products, and they also have better access to information
than most investors because information is made available to them on
a confidential basis during the ratings process. In addition, because
various regulatory determinations have depended on credit ratings,
rating agencies have regularly been called upon to rate securities. 173
172 Cf Schwarcz, supra note 49, at 240-41 (arguing that regulatory attempts to
limit uncertainty by standardizing transactions and financial products would likely
have unintended negative consequences).
173 Credit rating agencies have historically benefitted from their ability to confer
what Professor Frank Partnoy refers to as "regulatory licenses" upon entities that
depend on credit ratings. See Frank Partnoy, Historical Perspectives on the Financial Cri-
sis: Ivar Kreuger, the Credit-Rating Agencies, and Two Theories About the Function, and Dys-
function, of Markets, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 431, 432, 438 (2009) [hereinafter Partnoy,
Historical Perspectives] (discussing the role of credit agencies as providing "regulatory
licenses," i.e., the right to be in compliance with regulation); Frank Partnoy, The Para-
dox of Credit Ratings, in RATINGS, RATING AGENCIES, AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM
65, 65-84 (Richard M. Levich et al. eds., 2002) (same); Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and
Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U.
L.Q. 619, 623 (1999) [hereinafter Partnoy, Siskel and Ebert] (same). Because numer-
ous legal rules and regulations have historically depended substantively on credit rat-
ings, and particularly on those of a small number of Nationally Recognized Statistical
Ratings Organizations (NRSROs), financial market participants have become increas-
ingly dependent on credit ratings. See id. at 690-703 (documenting the growth of the
value of credit ratings beginning in the mid-1970s). The SEC recently removed refer-
ences to credit ratings in certain rules because of concerns that ratings requirements
constitute an "official seal of approval" that creates undue reliance on NRSRO ratings.
See References to Ratings of NRSROs, 74 Fed Reg. 52,358, 52,358 (Oct. 9, 2009) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242, 249, 270); see alsoJefferey Manns, Rating Risk
After the Subprime Mortgage Crisis: A User Fee Approach for Rating Agency Accountability, 87
N.C. L. REv. 1011, 1016 n.13 (2009) (analyzing the proposed rulemaking). The
recent financial reform legislation takes a similar approach by removing references to
NRSROs in several statutes. See Dodd-Frank Act § 939.
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As a result, they enjoy information advantages over investors arising
from their exclusive access to information and the specialization and
economies of scale associated with being frequent, repeat reviewers of
financial products. 174
Much has been made of the shortcomings of rating agencies,
especially following the recent global financial crisis. 175 Regulatory
reforms are focused, in part, on addressing these shortcomings. 176
Although it is too soon to predict the effect of these measures, we
believe that it is important to strive to harness the potential of rating
agencies to assess risk.1 77
A final approach to addressing the problem of information asym-
metries caused by complexity is to require those who "produce" risk to
place "skin in the game" by retaining a portion of the risk of loss asso-
ciated with the financial products being sold. 178 Risk-sharing of this
174 See Susan M. Phillips & Alan N. Rechtschaffen, International Banking Activities:
The Role of the Federal Reserve Bank in Domestic Capital Markets, 21 FORDHAM INT'L LJ.
1754, 1762-63 (1998) (arguing that credit rating agencies are capable of distilling vast
amounts of information, making them a critical tool for investors). But see Partnoy,
Historical Perspectives, supra note 173, at 432 (arguing that credit rating agencies do
not provide information to investors, but rather "regulatory licenses").
175 See, e.g., Claire A. Hill, Why Did RatingAgencies Do Such a BadJob Rating Subprime
Securities?, 71 U. PITr. L. REv. 585, 590-600 (2010) (exploring the shortcomings of
rating agencies); Manns, supra note 173, at 1013-14, 1043-48 (discussing the failures
of rating agencies and pointing out that private actors also shoulder blame).
176 See supra note 173 (discussing reforms concerning NRSROs). The financial
reform legislation also contains various mechanisms designed to strengthen credit
rating agencies, including a new Office of Credit Ratings within the SEC whose man-
date is, among other things, to prevent conflicts of interest. See Dodd-Frank Act
§§ 931-939. The legislation also attempts to eliminate conflicts of interest by ensur-
ing that the ratings functions of these agencies are separated from the sales and mar-
keting department. See id. § 932. There are other provisions in the bill intended to
ensure the legitimacy of rating agencies, including requiring independent boards,
continuing education, disclosure requirements, and exposing them to greater liabil-
ity. See id. §§ 931-939.
177 Professor Manns advocates the creation of an SEC-administered user fee sys-
tem whereby ratings agencies would have to bid for the right to rate debt. See Manns,
supra note 173, at 1059-65. Such a system would allow for coordination among credi-
tors to ensure that credit ratings are accurate and updated regularly. See id. at
1061-62. An alternative proposal byJohn Patrick Hunt would force rating agencies to
disgorge profits when rating new products if the ratings are ultimately judged to be
below a specified level of quality. See John Patrick Hunt, Credit Rating Agencies and the
"Worldwide Credit Crisis": The Limits of Reputation, the Insufficiency of Reform, and a Propo-
sal for Improvement, 2009 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 109, 182.




sort can be achieved in numerous ways. 179 What is important for our
purposes is that such measures mitigate the incentives of sellers of
complex financial products to transfer risks that are not easily dis-
cerned by others.180
B. Managing the Correlation Among Financial Institutions
Our discussion in Part III.A above sought to identify and address
the various behavioral and other market failures that cause market
participants to underestimate the likelihood of low-probability adverse
economic events at the individual firm level. It is insufficient, how-
ever, for systemic risk regulation to be limited to addressing risk-tak-
ing within firms because the financial system incorporates properties
of a complex network in which institutions are connected through
direct and indirect relationships. Our second correlation recognizes
that interconnections within the financial system have dynamic
effects. In this subpart, we examine the implications of these dynam-
ics for the functioning of financial markets and suggest that they pro-
vide an independent justification for their regulation.
1. Regulating Complexity Revisited
Complexity in the ways in which institutions interact generates
information uncertainty, which can impair the functioning of the
financial system. In a financial system, every market participant is the-
oretically vulnerable to every other market participant. 81 Market par-
ticipants are aware of this, but they may be unaware of the specific
channels through which an initial shock to the financial system will
travel and how large the ultimate impact of the shock will become. As
we described in Part II.A.2, networks transmit and amplify shocks in
ways that can be convoluted and unpredictable. In a market-based
financial system, the repercussions of an economic shock depend on
the precise ways in which institutions are linked. Systemic complexity
179 See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 85, at 1118-19 (discussing the possible use of
seller guaranties, such as warranties on the sale of goods, to shift risk from the buyer
to the seller). The Dodd-Frank Act attempts to limit conflicts of interest between
originators and investors in securitization transactions by requiring originators, in
many cases, to retain an unhedged economic interest (generally five percent) in the
credit risk of securitized assets. See Dodd-Frank Act §§ 941-945. The Act also limits
certain conflicts of interest in derivatives transactions, including conflicts between
swaps dealers and major swaps participants. See id. §§ 725, 731, 764-765.
180 Of course, risk sharing does not address failures by both parties to identify
risks-the problem of "mutual misinformation." See Schwarcz, supra note 49, at
241-42.
181 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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thus adds a layer of information uncertainty to that which exists at the
firm level.
Firms operating within the financial system confront varying
degrees of opaqueness regarding the identities of the parties holding
credit risk, the characteristics of the instruments they hold, and the
network topology that describes their interconnectivity. Such uncer-
tainty makes it difficult to ascertain the vulnerabilities of individual
institutions. An example is the counterparty risk that firms face on
derivatives contracts.'8 2 Market participants are exposed not only to
the risk that a counterparty will default on its obligation but also to
the risk that firms linked to that counterparty, either directly through
contracts or indirectly through markets, will fail to fulfill their obliga-
tions. Market participants recognize these risks, but they lack suffi-
cient information from which to determine the location of contingent
exposures within the financial system. As a result, if the financial con-
dition of a large market participant is compromised, firms may lose
confidence in their counterparties, irrespective of their actual
soundness.
Difficulties in assessing the vulnerability of market participants to
economic shocks is especially likely to arise when information about
the creditworthiness of individual financial firms is non-public and
thus asymmetric. Central clearing and settlement of derivatives
addresses concerns regarding asymmetric information by limiting
counterparty risk. "Clearing" is the process by which net payment
obligations between firms are computed, and "settlement" is the pro-
cess by which they are discharged.18 3 Contracts that are cleared and
settled are protected from counterparty default to the extent central
clearinghouses interpose themselves between the original counterpar-
ties, effectively guaranteeing the settlement of transactions. 8 4 This
means, for example, that in a swap transaction between parties X and
Y, a clearinghouse will be the counterparty in the middle. To protect
themselves, in turn, clearinghouses rely on a variety of risk-manage-
ment strategies, including margin requirements and the maintenance
of a loss-sharing pool funded by members to cover losses arising from
182 See supra notes 48, 88-89 and accompanying text.
183 See Christopher L. Culp, The Treasury Department's Proposed Regulation of OTC
Derivatives Clearing and Settlement, 8-9 (Univ. of Chi., Booth Sch. of Bus., Working
Paper No. 09-30, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol 3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=1430576.
184 See Darrell Duffle, How Should We Regulate Derivatives Markets?, 7-8 (Pew Fin.




any clearing member defaults. 185 Although central clearing does not
limit the aggregate amount of derivatives counterparty risk, it simpli-
fies the computation of that risk, which now can be measured by
aggregating clearinghouse risk. This enables counterparty risk to be
better monitored and, as appropriate, regulated by government agen-
cies, such as the SEC and CFTC. 186 Clearinghouses also serve to dis-
perse losses, reducing the systemic impact of the failure of an
individual firm. 1 87
While central clearing reduces counterparty risk posed by individ-
ual firms, it is an incomplete approach to systemic risk management
in several respects. First, it may have the perverse effect of increasing
systemic risk by concentrating derivatives exposure at the clearing-
house level. Central clearing merely shifts counterparty risk to a
clearinghouse, reducing that risk only to the extent that clearing-
houses can manage risk better or are more creditworthy than individ-
ual firms. Although clearinghouses have the ability to monitor the
positions that they clear and can pool losses among their members,
these advantages diminish in the face of correlated losses. Indeed,
central clearing can itself serve as a transmission mechanism for sys-
temic risk by concentrating credit risk within a few major clearing-
houses. If a major clearinghouse were to default, the credit risk
associated with all of the products cleared by it would simultaneously
rise.
Second, central clearing and settlement require some degree of
standardization in the financial products being cleared to facilitate
their valuation for purposes of calculating margin requirements. 88
Yet, as we pointed out earlier, standardization would be disruptive to
customized transactions that yield efficiencies in risk-bearing.' 8 9
Excluding non-standard derivatives from mandatory clearing, on the
185 See Culp, supra note 183, at 15-16
186 See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 721-774, 124 Stat. 1376,
1658-1802 (2010).
187 In dispersing risk among clearinghouse members, however, clearinghouses
may create the collective action problem that investors have reduced incentives to
monitor the actual risk posed by any given counterparty. In other words, risk transfer
can make individual risks relatively de minimis from the standpoint of any given mar-
ket participant. Cf Schwarcz, supra note 45, at 390-91 (asking whether structured
finance dispersed subprime mortgage risk so widely that no investor had a clear
incentive to monitor it).
188 See Duffle, supra note 184, at 8; John Hull, OTC Derivatives and Central Clear-
ing: Can All Transactions Be Cleared? 7, 10 (Apr. 2010) (unpublished working
paper), available at http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/-hull/downloadablepublica-
tions/HullOTC.pdf.
189 See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
2011] 1395
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
other hand, would leave unregulated financial products that could be
systemically significant. 190
The foregoing discussion shows why central clearing and settle-
ment are insufficient to prevent domino-type contagions that occur
directly through firms. Central clearing and settlement are also insuf-
ficient to prevent loss spirals that propagate through markets. To pre-
vent these loss spirals, we propose that systemic risk transmission be
further disrupted by enhancing the resilience of asset markets in times
of crisis. Asset markets can pose systemic risk when firms are forced to
sell illiquid assets in response to changes in short-term valuations.
When a firm is forced to sell an asset in an illiquid market, the asset's
market price is likely to deviate from its long-term value. Firms also
encounter liquidity needs because of maturity mismatches between
their assets and their liabilities. As long as a solvent firm's assets
mature when its debt is due, it will not encounter liquidity issues.
However, financial firms often use short-term borrowings to fund
long-term projects.1 91 If demands to repay the short-term borrowings
exceed available liquidity, firms must rely on external funding sources
to bridge the gap. When external funding is unavailable or prohibi-
tively expensive, it may be necessary to sell illiquid assets at a discount.
190 Cf Duffie, supra note 184, at 6 (explaining that the clearing of standard deriva-
tives would not have prevented the federal bailout of AIG because the CDS positions
held by AIG were not sufficiently standard). In the debate over the scope of deriva-
tives that should be cleared leading up to the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, promi-
nent figures, including Gary Gensler, Chairman of the CFTC, and Treasury Secretary
Timothy Geithner, advocated clearing standard derivatives. See Gary Gensler, The
Derivatives Debate: Clearinghouses Are the Answer, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 2010, at A21; Let-
ter from Timothy Geithner, Secretary of the Treasury, to Harry Reid, Senate Majority
Leader (May 13, 2009), http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/OTCletter.
pdf. Others argued that customized derivatives should also be cleared, while some
opposed any mandatory clearing requirement. See Carol E. Curtis, Derivatives Regula-
tion Could Be Bonanzafor Clearing Houses, SEC. TECH. MONITOR (Jan. 25, 2010), http://
www.securitiestechnologymonitor.com/issues/22-2/-24562-1.html (quoting John
Chrin, former Managing Director ofJPMorgan Chase, who argues in favor of clearing
customized derivatives); see also The Effective Regulation of the Over-the-Counter Derivatives
Market: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins. & Gov't Sponsored Enters. of the
H. Comm. on Fin. Seros., 11Ith Cong. 54-56 (2009) (statement of Terrence A. Duffy,
Executive Chairman, CME Group Inc.) (arguing that all derivatives clearing should
be voluntary). The Dodd-Frank Act includes provisions requiring that standard deriv-
atives be cleared through central clearinghouses. See Dodd-Frank Act § 956. Certain
customized derivative transactions, as well as derivatives transactions by non-financial
companies, however, are not subject to centralized clearing. See id. §§ 723, 727, 731,
763-764, 766.
191 See RicHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM 128-30 (2009) (discussing
why banks borrow short-term to fund long-term lending and explaining the risks asso-
ciated with such a practice).
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As we have pointed out, disposing of assets at fire-sale prices can initi-
ate a loss spiral in which forced selling leads to falling prices which, in
turn, leads to more forced selling. 192 These loss spirals can be amelio-
rated by decoupling the valuation of a financial asset for regulatory
purposes from its current market price at times when the two diverge
substantially. 193
Finally, greater transparency with respect to the credit risk posed
by existing or potential counterparties to derivatives transactions can
help to forestall the occurrence of contagion that is transmitted
through similarity effects. Recall that, in the presence of uncertainty
about a firm's counterparty exposure, market participants may incor-
rectly infer from the failure of that firm that other similarly-situated
firms are at risk.194 If market participants avoid dealing with firms
that they believe to be similarly situated to that distressed firm, the
localized economic shock to the distressed firm is transmitted to the
similarly situated firms.1 95 Disclosure of detailed information on posi-
tions beyond the information that is generally included in financial
statements can provide firms with the information they need to assess
counterparty risk, which should allow them to better protect them-
selves against default. It can also serve to protect markets from loss
spirals to the extent that firms are less likely to avoid doing business
192 See supra text accompanying note 19.
193 One approach to doing this is to value financial assets according to the liquid-
ity needs of the holder of the asset. This approach, known as "mark-to-funding,"
assumes that financial assets should be valued neither on the assumption that they will
be sold under then-current market conditions ("mark-to-market" valuation) nor on
the assumption that they will be owned through their life ("held-to-maturity" or "pre-
sent value" valuation). Rather, it reflects the principle that financial assets should be
valued based on the ability of their holder to finance, or "fund," their retention.
Under a mark-to-funding approach to valuation, the capacity to hold assets is evalu-
ated based on the term of the financial instruments that are used to fund them. If a
firm funds its holdings of long-term assets using short-term borrowings, for example,
then it would be required to value the assets based on current market prices; that is,
on a mark-to-market basis. See supra note 92. If, however, the assets are funded
through the issuance of long-term bonds, then the assets would be valued based on
the present value of their estimated future cash flows through maturity. See BRUN-
NERMEIER ET AL., supra note 91, at 43. Market liquidity could be additionally
enhanced by requiring financial products to be traded on regulated exchanges.
Exchanges provide a trading venue for the products they list, facilitating the incorpo-
ration of new information into securities prices, which are reported. In contrast,
securities that trade in over-the-counter transactions are privately negotiated and their
pricing is confidential. Exchange-traded securities must be standardized and trade
with sufficient frequency in order to ensure their liquidity.
194 See Gordon & Muller, supra note 97, at 7.
195 See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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with a counterparty based on a mistaken assumption about that
counterparty's holdings.
Currently, third parties cannot readily determine the exposure of
financial market participants to specific securities because there is no
single location from which that information can be obtained.
Counterparties can mitigate this risk voluntarily by disclosing their
contingent liabilities, but it is unlikely that such disclosure will be
credible. The Dodd-Frank Act 196 has addressed this problem in part
by requiring counterparties to report transactions to a swap data
repository from which regulators can ascertain risk allocation. 197
Because contract information would be aggregated in one place, the
database would allow regulators to view market exposure on contracts
and assess risk from a systemic vantage point, which is critical in times
of uncertainty. 198 Requiring detailed contract information to be
made public is likely to be viewed as revealing proprietary information
regarding contract terms, trading positions, and investment strate-
gies. 199 Vis-d-vis other market participants, concerns about confidenti-
ality can be addressed, however, by controlling the type and level of
aggregation of the information being disseminated, as well as its
timeliness. 200
If greater transparency is to result in more accurate securities
pricing, market participants must be capable of incorporating infor-
mation into securities markets. Increased speed in data transmission
is generally associated with market efficiency. 201 Because of the
196 Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scat-
tered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
197 See id. § 727. Individual counterparty trade and position data must be reported
to regulators upon request. See id. § 728(c) (7). The Act requires that the SEC and
the CFTC make publicly available swap trading volume and position data but only in
aggregate form. See id. § 729.
198 See Viral V. Acharya et al., Centralized Clearing for Credit Derivatives, in RESTORiNG
FINANCLAL STABILITY, supra note 164, at 251, 266.
199 See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Trading Places: Securities Regulation, Market Crisis,
and Network Risk 61-62 (Northwestern Univ. Sch. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Series, No. 09-01, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=1324951. Swap transaction data, including price and volume, are to be
reported to the public in real-time under the new law. See Dodd-Frank Act § 727.
200 See Dodd-Frank Act § 727(13) (E) (providing that publicly reported data for
certain swaps not identify participants and instituting a time delay for reporting large
block trades).
201 See Matt Samelson, Answering the Question of High-Frequency Trading, SEC. INDUS.
NEWS, May 3, 2010, at 23 (arguing that high-frequency trading has improved execu-
tion quality and reduced short-term volatility in large cap U.S. equities); James Angel
et al., Equity Trading in the 21st Century 5-6 (USC Marshall Sch. of Bus., Marshall
Research Paper Series, Working Paper FBE 09-10, 2010), available at http://papers.
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extreme speeds at which algorithmic trading takes place, however,
there is a danger that trading in highly automated markets will some-
times occur at aberrant prices. 20 2 On May 6th, 2010, the Dow Jones
Industrial Average plunged nearly 1000 points in twenty minutes.
20 3
The "flash crash" was precipitated by a trader executing an algorithm
to sell approximately $4.1 billion worth of stock market index futures
contracts without regard to time or price.20 4 In response, the SEC
adopted a universal circuit breaker rule to halt trading of an individ-
ual security across all exchanges for five minutes if its price moves up
or down ten percent or more over a five-minute period.205 Assuming
a security's price has been pushed below its intrinsic value, a pause
should give traders enough time to recognize the disparity and to
respond if they believe the security is mispriced. 20 6
ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1584026 (arguing that high-frequency trading
results in improved market quality).
202 Cf Clark, supra note 99 (discussing the risk implications of high-frequency
trading).
203 See CFTC & SEC, supra note 102, at 2. During this period, otherwise valuable
stocks traded momentarily at distorted prices, including as low as one cent. See id. at
34.
204 See CFTC & SEC, supra note 100, at 14. The market was able to handle a trade
of a similar size by the same trader in the past because there was sufficient liquidity to
absorb the order over a five-hour period. However, the prior algorithm executed
much more slowly as it factored in time and price, as well as volume. See id. On May
6, the downward selling pressure was exacerbated by high-frequency traders issuing
sell orders to reduce their temporary long positions after they had absorbed a large
part of the initial sell order. See id. at 15. As the price of the contracts was pushed
further downward, the traders' volume-based sell algorithm began to execute even
faster due to the increased volume generated by high-frequency traders. See id. The
interaction between two different types of algorithmic trading strategies resulted in an
erosion of liquidity and downward price pressure that reverberated across the entire
market. See id. at 6.
205 See Order Granting Accelerated Approval to Proposed Rule Change to Amend
FINRA Rule 6121, 75 Fed. Reg. 34,183, 34,183-86 (June 16, 2010) [hereinafter
FINRA Order]. The disparate mechanisms exchanges used to determine when to
pause trading in volatile stocks were identified by the SEC as a possible aggravating
factor in the flash crash. See CFTC & SEC, supra note 102, at 32. Under the new
universal approach to circuit breakers, the primary listing exchange of a security must
notify the other exchanges and market participants when the price of the security
moves ten percent or more in the preceding five-minute period. See FINRA Order, 75
Fed. Reg. 34 at 184.
206 However, there is a possibility that traders might mistakenly believe that a trad-
ing pause caused by order imbalance was based on fundamental valuation issues. See
Letter from Larry Harris, USC Marshall Sch. of Bus., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y,
SEC 3 (May 26, 2010), available at http://ftp.sec.gov/comments/sr-nyse-2010-39/nyse
201039-4.pdf. Therefore, a universal circuit breaker could aggravate the problem,
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The adoption of the universal circuit breaker rule reflects that
traditional market-wide circuit breakers can create instability in
increasingly temporally complex markets.20 7 The universal circuit
breaker rule is an important first step in counteracting the effects of
an erroneous trade, an ill-designed sell algorithm, or a cascade of
stop-loss market orders. 20 If the universal circuit breaker proves suc-
cessful, regulators may consider expanding the program to informal
markets. 20 9 We are hopeful that regulators will continue to develop
ways to limit the extent to which technology can contribute to the
transmission of localized economic shocks to other parts of the finan-
cial system.2 10 Even the best risk-management strategies will be inef-
because traders might increase the order imbalance during the trading halt rather
than stabilize it. See id.
207 A circuit breaker is a procedure for temporarily halting trading when a severe
market downturn threatens to exhaust available liquidity. See Circuit Breakers and Other
Market Volatility Procedures, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answers/circuit.htm (last modi-
fied Oct. 13, 2010). Existing circuit breakers in place on the New York Stock
Exchange, which are based on the Dow Jones Industrial Average, were not triggered
during the flash crash despite the incredible volatility of individual stocks listed on the
exchange. SeeJohn Wu, SEC Stock Market Circuit Breaker for Exchanges, NYSE and NAS-
DAQ SUITE101 (May 18, 2010), http://www.suitel01.com/content/sec-stock-market-
circuit-breaker-for-exchanges-nyse-and-nasdaq-a238700. In a temporally complex
market, liquidity may be exhausted before the traditional market-wide circuit break-
ers are even implemented. Instead, universal circuit breakers, tied to the price move-
ment of an individual security rather than an index price, could increase market
stability by controlling the volatility of individual stocks, preventing a liquidity crisis
from spreading to the entire market.
208 The SEC received comments from parties concerned that circuit breakers
could exacerbate price volatility by inducing panic. See FINRA Order, 75 Fed. Reg. at
34,185. However, most concluded that a universal circuit breaker would reduce
excess market volatility. See id. at 34,185-86. Circuit breakers are also criticized as
giving an unfair advantage to market makers and sophisticated traders over individual
investors. See Frank Partnoy, Why Markets Crash and What Law Can Do About It, 61 U.
PITT. L. REV. 741, 783 (2000); cf Emilios Avgouleas, A New Framework for the Global
Regulation of Short Sales: Why Prohibition Is Insufficient and Disclosure Insufficient, 16 STAN.
J.L. Bus. & FIN. 376 (2010) (arguing that the circuit breaker rule takes into account
both longer term price trends and levels of liquidity).
209 Circuit breakers are designed to prevent the exhaustion of liquidity or to
restore liquidity to an ill-functioning market. See Circuit Breakers and Other Market Vola-
tility Procedures, supra note 207. Thus, as a precondition to implementation on any
informal market, the market must contain mechanisms that would allow for liquidity
to be replenished during a trading halt. Otherwise, circuit breakers are bound to be
ineffective or even counterproductive. If a security's price has been pushed below its
intrinsic value in an illiquid market, the triggering of a circuit breaker may only serve
to fuel panic. See Partnoy, supra note 208, at 783.
210 For example, the SEC has also proposed a rule that would ban unfiltered spon-
sored access to exchanges, a practice common to high-frequency traders, by requiring
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fective to the extent that they can be eluded by mistake or design.
Controlling the transmission of localized shocks within the financial
system thus necessitates not only providing market participants with
sufficient information to evaluate risks accurately, but also ensuring
that human judgment is not displaced by new technologies.
2. Regulating the Financial Commons
Even if firms had complete information regarding their
counterparties' exposures and the prices of financial assets accurately
reflected their long-term values, the level of risk in the financial sys-
tem would still be suboptimally high. As we discussed in Part II.A, the
existing financial regulatory framework largely ignores the "com-
mons" aspect of the financial system-the problem that, in the pres-
ence of externalities, over-exploitation of shared resources occurs. If
financial market participants perceive their price of risk as being artifi-
cially low, they will "over consume" it, producing excessive levels of
systemic risk. It is in each individual firm's interest to pursue this
tragic course of action, despite the fact that its private gains are
exceeded by social losses. And firms are especially likely to over-con-
sume this risk if abstaining from such over-consumption would cause
them to suffer an inferior payoff relative to other parties, such as a
reduction of market share. Systemic risk regulation can therefore be
justified on the basis of another market failure: the unregulated cost
to market participants of financial-market risk understates its true cost
to society.
To be sure, existing financial regulation aims to secure the stabil-
ity of the financial system. In doing so, however, it does not take suffi-
cient account of the systemic importance of the behavior of individual
financial institutions. In that sense, it is incomplete. The primary reg-
ulatory instruments now used to address systemic risk are deposit
insurance, capital adequacy requirements, and the supervisory pro-
cess.211 In the United States, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion (FDIC) insures bank deposits with the aim of alleviating fear that
that all trades be subject to pre-trade risk filters. See Risk Management Controls for
Brokers or Dealers with Market Access, 75 Fed. Reg. 4007, 4011-15 Uan. 26, 2010) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R pt. 240). Such risk filters could potentially limit the transmis-
sion of a localized shock by reducing the likelihood that high-frequency traders will
default on their obligations, which would have to be covered by the firms' clearing
members. See Clark, supra note 99 (discussing the risk implication of unfiltered spon-
sored access and noting that "[c]learing members are financially responsible for the
trades of their customers").
211 See BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 91, at 1-11; Martin Summer, Banking Reg-
ulation and Systemic Risk, 14 OPEN ECONOMIES REv. 43, 47-51 (2003).
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banks will default on deposit accounts. 212 Banks are also required to
hold minimum capital based on the riskiness of their assets. 213 The
main objective of the supervisory process is to evaluate the safety and
soundness of banking organizations, including assessment of their
individual financial condition, risk-management programs, and com-
pliance with applicable laws. The foregoing tools are directed at
reducing the likelihood of the failure of individual banks as a means
of protecting the financial system. The lesson of the tragedy of the
commons, however, is that overexploitation of shared resources
occurs in advance of its impact on individual group members. Thus,
the financial system can be endangered even while its individual mem-
bers appear to be in sound financial condition.
Analogizing excessive risk-taking to the tragedy of the commons
suggests that regulatory policy should correct for risk-spillovers in
financial markets by requiring firms to take into account the impact of
their behavior on systemic stability.214 To induce firms to manage risk
with the interests of the financial system in mind entails causing them
to take into account the systemic importance of their activities. In
general, when the social cost of an action exceeds its private cost, a tax
equal to the difference between the two can correct the market out-
come.215 The tax induces decisionmakers to internalize the costs to
others of their behavior, resulting in a reduction in the activity.
Increased minimum risk-based financial ratios have recently been
advanced by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 216 to
enhance systemic stability.217 These ratios are commonly used to mea-
sure a firm's strengths and weaknesses along various dimensions.
They can also be used to manage a firm's cost of doing business
because they produce tax-like effects. Capital adequacy ratios, for
example, compel firms to set aside minimum capital levels relative to
212 See Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 210.
213 See id.
214 An earlier version of the Dodd-Frank Act included a provision that would have
helped to address the tragedy of the commons-a resolution fund sourced by large
banks and other systemically important financial institutions to be used as a possible
bailout mechanism in lieu of taxpayer funds. See Restoring American Financial Stabil-
ity Act of 2010, S. 3217, 111th Cong. § 210(n) (2009). This provision was dropped,
however, after certain politicians alleged it would institutionalize bailouts. See Greg
Hitt & Damian Paletta, Senate Ends Financial-Bill Standoff WALL ST.J., Apr. 29, 2010, at
A2.
215 See Korinek, supra note 10, at 4.
216 See supra note 163.
217 See Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision Announces Higher Global Minimum




their risk-weighted assets. It is not our purpose here to evaluate the
relative merits of each type of financial ratio. Rather, our aim is to
describe how an appreciation of the commons aspect of the financial
system can inform their use.
Conceptually, risk-based financial ratio requirements can be used
to preserve the financial commons by making those requirements sen-
sitive to a firm's systemic importance. 218 A firm's systemic importance
is a function of two variables. The first is the extent of the firm's
direct importance to other market participants through, for example,
its counterparty relationships. The second is the extent of the firm's
indirect importance to other market participants resulting from the
degree of correlation of its assets with market assets. An asset with a
higher degree of market correlation would, for example, be consid-
ered more systemically significant because its forced liquidation would
negatively impact a market to which other firms were exposed.
Precise specification of the systemic risk function would require
an understanding of the entire topology of the financial system.
Determining the systemic importance of even a single asset held by a
firm, for example, involves knowing the quantities of the asset held by
each firm, the pattern of those holdings, and the elasticity of the
asset's demand curve. In practice, the task of gathering the informa-
tion that is necessary to evaluate the interconnections among financial
institutions, although daunting, is achievable through a requirement
that counterparties, or intermediaries for those parties, report transac-
tions that bear on risk allocation to a central data repository.219 Only
with such detailed knowledge can the true systemic importance of a
firm be measured and its potential to impair the financial system be
charged to it to safeguard the financial commons.
C. Addressing Systemic Crises Ex Post
Our primary objective until now has been to identify behavioral
and other market failures within the financial system that prevent
financial market participants from addressing risk to a socially optimal
degree and to suggest avenues for safeguarding financial systemic sta-
bility through regulatory approaches directed at these failures. We
recognize, however, that policies designed to implement such regula-
218 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has espoused the view that sys-
temically important financial firms should have loss absorbing capacity beyond the
capacity of financial firms generally, but has not yet developed standards for such
firms. See BASEL III AccoRD, http://www.basel-iii-accord.com (last visited Feb. 7,
2011).
219 See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
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tory approaches may not be politically feasible. Even if they were fea-
sible, prescriptive regulation cannot always prevent systemic
breakdowns. Market participants cannot anticipate "black swan"
events, which are unforeseen, however incentivized they are to do so.
In addition, there are epistemological limits to our ability to discern
hidden correlations within the financial system, and new correlations
may emerge. When prescriptive regulation fails, it may be desirable
for government to intervene to preserve the stability of the financial
system on an ex post basis.
A market liquidity provider of last resort (a "market liquidity pro-
vider") can serve to address market breakdowns while minimizing
moral hazard. 220 The objective of a market liquidity provider would
be to stabilize financial markets in times of panic, when securities
prices have fallen below their intrinsic values. 22' A market liquidity
provider must have the necessary means to take sufficiently large posi-
tions in the markets it targets. Such an entity would likely have to be
governmental, 222 though it may be able to obtain partial funding from
220 Such a market liquidity provider would clearly operate ex post, insofar as it
would limit systemic consequences. Semantically, however, this article's focus on dis-
rupting the transmission of systemic risk could be viewed as either ex ante (insofar as a
disruption mechanism makes the financial system more resilient) or ex post (insofar as
a disruption mechanism mitigates an actual failure from spreading). For a more
detailed analysis of ex ante and ex post financial regulation, see Iman Anabtawi &
Steven L. Schwarcz, A Theory of Ex Post Financial Regulation (working draft) (on file
with authors).
221 The Troubled Asset Relief Program, commonly known as TARP, was initially
intended promote financial stability by allowing the U.S. Department of the Treasury
to purchase troubled assets from financial firms, but was replaced by programs under
which the Treasury would invest directly in the equity of financial firms and guarantee
new debt issuances. See Dinara Bayazitova & Anil Shivdasani, Assessing TARP 8-10
(July 2010) (unpublished working paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=1 461884.
222 As a governmental entity, a market liquidity provider would bear at least super-
ficial similarity to the U.S. Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), created in 1989 to
clean up the savings and loan (S&L) mess by buying troubled loans. The RTC, how-
ever, "is not a perfect parallel for today's needs" for several reasons, including that it
was created to clean up the mess years after it occurred, not necessarily (as this chap-
ter also contemplates for a market liquidity provider) to minimize occurrence of the
mess. Beyond Crisis Management: Bold Ideas for Solving America's Financial Mess, ECONO-
MIST, Sept. 20, 2008, at 94. Nonetheless, the RTC is a helpful model insofar as it
represents a credible and reasonably efficient model of a governmental entity
purchasing troubled financial assets. See Sudhir Nanda et al., An Analysis of Resolution
Trust Corporation Transactions: Auction Market Process and Pricing, 25 J. REAL EST. ECON.
271, 290 (1997) (concluding that mispricing of its purchases were not typical but
occurred only in limited cases).
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the private sector.223 A market liquidity provider could support pan-
icked markets by purchasing market securities at prices that are below
their intrinsic values but above their then-current prices. 2 24 Alterna-
tively, a market liquidity provider could try to stabilize markets by
assuming through derivatives contracts only risks that the markets
have the greatest difficulty hedging.225
The U.S. government acted as a market liquidity provider in a
limited context in the recent financial crisis. Shortly after Lehman
Brothers failed, the commercial paper market collapsed. 226  In
response, the Federal Reserve created the Commercial Paper Funding
Facility (CPFF), to act as a lender of last resort for that market, with
the goal of addressing "temporary liquidity distortions" by purchasing
commercial paper from highly rated issuers that could not otherwise
sell their paper.227 The CPFF apparently helped to stabilize the com-
mercial paper market. 228
The foregoing types of strategies aimed at supporting financial
markets in times of crisis by providing liquidity should be more cost-
effective than strategies in which governments act as a lender of last
resort to financial firms. 229 A lender of last resort is more likely to
223 For example, as part of an ongoing effort to improve the balance sheets of
financial firms, the Treasury Department is pursuing the Public-Private Investment
Program (PPIP). Under the PPIP, capital earmarked for the Troubled Asset Relief
Program is co-invested alongside private capital in eligible securities, a portion of
which consists of non-recourse government loans. See Public Private Investment Pro-
gram, U.S. DEP'T TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/
investment-programs/ppip/Pages/publicprivatefund.aspx (last visited Mar. 6, 2011);
see also Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 226-27 (examining how to privatize the role of a
market liquidity provider).
224 To induce holders of securities to sell them at such prices, the market liquidity
provider could employ flexible pricing approaches such as those used in structured
financing transactions to buy financial assets of uncertain value. See Steven L.
Schwarcz, Too Big to Fail?: Recasting the Financial Safety Net, in THE PANIC OF 2008, at 94,
99 (Lawrence E. Mitchell & Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., eds., 2010).
225 For example, in an effort to encourage private entities to purchase toxic assets
from banks, the Treasury Department proposed guaranteeing a floor value of these
troubled assets. See Floyd Norris, U.S. Bank Bailout to Rely in Part on Private Money, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 9, 2009, at Al.
226 Commercial paper consists of short-term corporate promissory notes.
227 See Tobias Adrian et al., The Federal Reserve's Commercial Paper Funding Facility,
FRBNY ECON. POL'Y REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 1), available at http://www.
ny.frb.org/research/epr/forthcoming/ lOO6adri.pdf.
228 See id. (manuscript) (concluding that "[t]he CPFF indeed had a stabilizing
effect on the commercial paper market").
229 The U.S. Federal Reserve Bank has traditionally acted as a lender of last resort
in "unusual and exigent circumstances" to banks and other financial institutions. See
Gordon & Muller, supra note 97, at 29-34 (describing the history of emergency lend-
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foster moral hazard by providing a safety net to fiscally reckless enti-
ties, particularly those that believe they are "too big to fail." Moreo-
ver, loans may never be repaid if the lender eventually fails. In
contrast, a market liquidity provider can instill confidence in markets
by establishing a floor on prices and at the same time giving taxpayers
a chance to profit by purchasing securities at a discount to their intrin-
sic values.
D. Applying the Framework to Financial Crises
In this subpart we test the conceptual framework of this Article by
examining how it would have applied to the four financial crises dis-
cussed in Part I.B.
1. The Great Depression
In the Great Depression, the first correlation was triggered by
complacency in the form of optimism bias and availability bias that led
banks to underestimate a low-probability risk of margin lending to
risky borrowers, namely the risk that stock value (which in the recent
past had only risen) would decline in value. These biases could have
been managed through regulation requiring banks to stress their
assumptions to reasonable worst-case scenarios. Stock prices histori-
cally rise and fall, so banks making margin loans would have had to
take into account the potential impact of a falling stock market on
repayment of their loans. Regulation also could have addressed com-
placency by requiring that the collateral for margin loans made to
risky borrowers exceed loan value by a minimum threshold based on
reasonable worst-case scenarios.2 30
ing by the Federal Reserve under § 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act). The Dodd-
Frank Act drastically limits the authority of the Federal Reserve to make emergency
loans under § 13(3). The Act amends § 13(3) to require the Federal Reserve to con-
sult with and receive approval from the Secretary of the Treasury to ensure that any
emergency lending is designed to provide liquidity to the markets and not to aid a
financially failing firm. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1101(a)(6), 124
Stat. 1376, 2113-15 (2010). The FDIC is authorized to make short-term loans to sol-
vent depository institutions subject to Congressional approval. See id. § 1105.
230 After the Great Depression, the Federal Reserve promulgated one-size-fits-all
rules to this effect. See Disclosure and Reporting of CRA-Related Agreements (Regu-
lation G), 12 C.R.F § 207 (2010); Credit by Brokers and Dealers (Regulation T), 12
C.F.R. § 220 (2010); Credit by Banks and Persons Other than Brokers or Dealers for
the Purpose of Purchasing or Carrying Margin Stock (Regulation 0), 12 C.F.R. § 221
(2010); Borrowers of Securities Credit (Regulation X), 12 C.F.R. § 224 (2010)
(requiring two-to-one collateral coverage for all margin loans).
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The combining of the first correlation with the second-in the
case of the Great Depression, an interconnectedness among banks-
caused the individual bank failures (resulting from margin-lending
losses) to trigger a broader systemic shock. The conductivity of the
network formed by that interconnectedness could have been man-
aged through regulation designed to mitigate loss spirals, such as
requiring banks to maintain financial robustness (e.g., through risk-
based financial ratios) and to also maintain sufficient liquidity to avoid
having to sell assets at fire-sale prices in order to pay current debts.
2. Long-Term Capital Management
The first correlation was triggered by complacency in the form of
overreliance on recent patterns in bond pricing and overreliance on
mathematical models incorporating these patterns. That lead LTCM
to ignore a low-probability risk that these patterns could change-a
change subsequently caused by a default on Russian government
bonds. This complacency could have been managed through regula-
tion designed to require financial firms to stress their assumptions to
reasonable worst-case scenarios.
When LTCM was about to fail, the Federal Reserve stepped in to
broker a deal to prevent default, thereby avoiding triggering a
broader systemic shock. The Fed clearly recognized, consistent with
the second correlation, an interconnectedness among large non-bank
financial firms (like LTCM) and banks resulting from interlinked con-
tractual obligations. The conductivity of the network formed by that
interconnectedness could have been managed through regulation
designed to mitigate loss spirals, such as making counterparty risk
more transparent and requiring even large non-bank financial firms
to maintain financial robustness and to also maintain sufficient liquid-
ity to pay current debts without having to sell assets at fire-sale prices.
Because these latter requirements can be costly, they could be applied
only to non-bank financial firms of systemic importance-systemic
importance being measured by such factors as the firm's size, the
extent of its counterparty relationships, and (to mitigate the harm of
selling assets at fire-sale prices) the degree of correlation of the firm's
assets with financial-market assets and assets owned by other firms.
3. Enron
The first correlation was triggered by complacency in the form of
optimism bias and availability bias, exacerbated by a conflict of inter-
est between Enron's chief financial officer (Andrew Fastow) and the
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firm,23 1 and further exacerbated by the complexity of Enron's struc-
tured transactions. As a result, Enron underestimated the risk that its
stock, which had been rising in price, would fall-a fall that ultimately
required Enron to pay on guarantees of the structured transactions,
causing Enron to lose its investment-grade rating and thus its business
viability.
This correlation could have been managed through regulation
designed to address complacency, conflicts, and complexity. Regula-
tion could have addressed complacency by requiring financial firms to
stress their assumptions to reasonable worst-case scenarios. Even
though Enron's stock price had consistently risen, stock market prices
generally rise and fall; thus, a fall in the overall stock market could (as
in fact happened) cause a fall in Enron's stock price. Regulation
could have addressed conflicts by requiring financial firms to better
align compensation incentives with long-term interests of the firm,
such as by pay-risk disclosure and risk-sharing. Thus, Enron would
have had to disclose that Fastow's compensation in his capacity as an
agent in Enron's structured transactions dwarfed his Enron compen-
sation. Fastow also would have had to share a measure of losses if
Enron ever had to pay on the guarantees of those transactions. That
sharing of economic risk also would have mitigated the problem of
complexity-in Enron's case, that the structured transactions were so
complex that even Enron's board of directors did not fully under-
stand them. 232 By having "skin in the game," Fastow would have had
less incentive to make these transactions complex in order to mislead
his firm.
Enron's collapse did not trigger a systemic financial crisis because
it was not closely correlated with the viability of other financial institu-
tions. Thus, even large financial firms are not always interconnected
in systemically significant ways. The significance of interconnections
among firms would depend to a large extent on the contractual obli-
gations between them.
4. The Recent Global Financial Crisis
The first correlation was triggered by complacency in the form of
optimism bias and availability bias, exacerbated by conflicts of interest
231 For a discussion of this conflict of interest, see Schwarcz, supra note 30, at
1312.
232 See WILLIAM C. POWERS, JR., ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL
INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. 182, 202




between financial firms and their secondary managers and the com-
plexity of modern financial products, and further exacerbated by the
"commons" problem. As a result, many financial firms underesti-
mated the low-probability risk that housing prices would decline, caus-
ing subprime mortgage loans to default.
This correlation could have been managed through regulation
designed to address complacency, conflicts, complexity, and the com-
mons problem. Complacency could have been regulated by requiring
financial firms to stress their assumptions to reasonable worst-case sce-
narios. Thus, subprime mortgage lenders would have had to high-
light how falling housing prices could affect repayment of their loans.
Regulation also could have addressed complacency by requiring that
the value of the houses collateralizing subprime mortgage loans
exceed loan value by a minimum threshold based on reasonable
worst-case scenarios of housing prices.
Conflicts could have been regulated by requiring financial firms
to better align compensation incentives, including those of secondary
managers, with long-term interests of the firm. For example, regula-
tion could have required financial firms to pay a portion of manage-
ment compensation contingently over time or in the form of equity,
or to pay compensation subject to retroactive clawback. Investment
analysts then would have been much less likely, for example, to rec-
ommend that their firms invest in complex and highly-leveraged asset-
backed securities that they did not fully understand.
Although complexity could have been regulated by requiring a
degree of standardization of financial products, that could backfire,
limiting the flexibility needed to design financial products to respond
to or anticipate investor needs. Complexity also could have been
addressed through centralized risk assessment. Although rating agen-
cies attempted to perform this function, they failed to accurately pre-
dict risk on the most leveraged tranches of securities backed by
subprime mortgages. Regulation can be used, however, to attempt to
address potential flaws in the rating process; and, indeed, has already
begun to do so. 233 Additionally, complexity could have been regu-
lated by requiring those who produce risk to place skin in the game,
for example by requiring underwriters of complex financial products
to retain a degree of risk on the products they sell.
The commons problem could have been regulated by requiring
financial firms to take into account the impact of their behavior on
systemic stability. Regulation could have required these firms, for
example, to manage risk levels not only to maximize their own share-
233 See supra note 176.
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holder value but also to protect the interests of third parties from sys-
temic consequences. Thus, financial firms could have been required
to maintain sufficient liquidity to avoid needing to sell assets at fire-
sale prices and possibly also to comply with robust financial adequacy
requirements. Because these requirements can be costly, they could
(as previously discussed) be applied only to firms of systemic
importance.
The financial crisis occurred when the first correlation combined
with the second-an interconnectedness among institutions. This
caused localized defaults on asset-backed securities to trigger a wide-
spread loss of confidence in debt markets, in turn cutting off credit,
creating counterparty risk, and triggering a global systemic shock.
The conductivity of the network formed by the interconnectedness
among institutions could have been managed through regulation
designed to mitigate loss spirals, such as decoupling financial asset
valuation from current market prices at times when the two substan-
tially diverge and requiring greater transparency of credit exposures
of counterparties to potential liabilities.
This Part has examined, in the context of the financial crises dis-
cussed in Part I.B, how regulation could have helped to disrupt the
transmission of systemic risk by weakening correlations within the
financial system that serve to transmit systemic risk. We do not claim
that regulation can always be successful in preventing systemic crises,
merely that regulation based on an understanding of the transmission
mechanism for systemic risk is more likely to be successful. To the
extent such regulation is unsuccessful, we have discussed in Part III.C
how systemic crises could be addressed ex post.
CONCLUSION
As a result of the recent global financial crisis, there is widespread
support for using regulatory policy to reduce systemic risk. To be
effective, however, systemic risk regulation must address the underly-
ing causes of systemic instability. Our objective in this Article has
been to provide a theoretical framework that can help inform the
efforts of policymakers as they pursue this task.
Despite the enormous resources being devoted by policymakers
to systemic risk regulation, current measures aimed at reducing the
likelihood of another systemic breakdown are largely untethered from
a coherent theoretical account of the underlying causes of systemic
crises, raising the possibility that the resulting financial regulatory
reforms will be sub-optimally designed or even misdirected. Under
our theoretical framework, one focus of optimal regulation should be
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on attempting to weaken correlations within the financial system that
serve to transmit systemic risk. Localized economic shocks, by them-
selves, are unlikely to produce systemic effects, but when these shocks
are transmitted through firms and markets, even relatively small
shocks can have systemic consequences. This analysis implies that reg-
ulation should be designed to disrupt that transmission.
The framework that we have set forth can help to guide the
course of global financial regulatory reform. It is especially pertinent
to domestic U.S. regulation. The Dodd-Frank Act represents a wide-
ranging effort to safeguard the stability of the financial system, but
much of the substance of that Act will be realized in the future
through administrative rulemaking. To that end, the Dodd-Frank Act
creates a Financial Stability Oversight Council to examine and moni-
tor possible sources of systemic risk.234 The Council is further author-
ized to identify regulatory gaps and other potential threats to the
nation's financial stability.23 5
Regulators are thus in a position to analyze how systemic risk is
transmitted and to monitor that transmission, including transmission
through the correlations we have identified. They will also be able to
advance additional regulatory recommendations. 236 Other scholars
234 See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 111, 124 Stat. 1376, 1392-94
(2010). The Secretary of the Treasury chairs the Council, which has nine additional
voting members (all but one of whom is a federal agency head, including the Chair-
man of the Federal Reserve Board). The Council has authority to designate certain
firms as "systemically important." See id. §§ 112-115. For firms so designated, the
Council may instruct the Federal Reserve to impose various regulatory constraints,
including capital, leverage, and liquidity requirements, periodic "stress testing." See
id. A systemically important firm also can be required to submit a resolution plan that
sets forth how, if it fails, the firm would wind down in a way that minimizes systemic
impact. See id. (although the Federal Bankruptcy Code arguably already provides suf-
ficient resolution procedures for this purpose). Because the Council only meets peri-
odically, its day-to-day operations are run through a new Office of Financial Research
within the Department of the Treasury. This office is responsible for collecting data
from regulators and market participants, issuing reports on potential regulatory gaps,
and making supervisory recommendations. See id. §§ 116, 152-154.
235 See id. §§ 116, 152-154. Under the Act, the Council may subject not only
banks but also other large financial companies, including investment banks, broker-
dealers, asset management firms, and insurance companies, to registration and
reporting requirements and direct supervision by the Federal Reserve. See id. § 102.
236 We cannot know with certainty how successful the Act will ultimately be at
disrupting the systemic risk transmission mechanism that we have elaborated. Noth-
ing in the Act's statutory language statutory addresses it directly. The Act potentially
addresses systemic risk transmission through its impact on certain aspects of the mar-
ket failures-namely, conflicts and complexity-that underlie the transmission of sys-
temic risk. These provisions are discussed throughout this Article in the sections to
which they relate.
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have argued the near-impossibility of substantially reducing systemic
risk.237 They may be correct, and it is not our purpose here to assess
the accuracy of their claims. What is clear, we think, is that policymak-
ers seeking to preserve the stability of the financial system will be
unsuccessful in doing so unless they take into account the two correla-
tions about which we write and their potential to combine. Failure to
do so, we fear, will lead to misdirected regulation that will not only
leave the financial system exposed to future crises, but also impose
unnecessary costs on the financial sector and the real economy.
23 8
237 See, e.g., CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. RoGOFF, THIS TIME Is DIFFERENT
(2009).
238 Two provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act are already troubling in this regard. If
the Secretary of the Treasury designates a systemically important financial firm that
defaults or is at risk of default as a "covered financial company," that firm cannot
reorganize through the Federal Bankruptcy Code but, instead, must be liquidated
under Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) receivership. See Dodd-Frank
Act §§ 204-205. Another provision sharply limits the power of the Federal Reserve to
make emergency loans to individual or insolvent firms, thereby restricting the Federal
Reserve's long-standing ability to act as a liquidity provider of last resort to financial
institutions. See id. § 1101(a) (6). Perversely, these provisions actually increase the
risk that a systemically important financial firm will fail, transmitting failure to other
financial institutions through their inter-institutional correlation.
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